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This thesis examines the causes of slow economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In particular, it attempts to identify the links between economic growth and the dual-
economic system that exists in most African countries. In doing so, the thesis argues that, 
without inclusive efforts to lift national or regional economies as one package, the 
problem with slow growth will persist. In the past, much effort has been oriented toward 
developing African capitalist economies by focusing on the modern sector while the 
indigenous or traditional economy that has sustained Africans for generations has been 
ignored. The main finding of the thesis is that the traditional sector appears to be rejecting 
any attempts to be conquered by a foreign capitalist system; at the same time, however, 
traditional economies have not had a good track record for attracting economic growth. In 
order to grow economies in Africa, the gap between the formal and informal economies 
will have to be reduced.  
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Until recently, the gross domestic product (GDP) for the vast majority of 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)1 saw little change since independence from 
colonial rules. In fact, some African countries experienced a decline in GDP since.2 More 
depressing is that there are no clear answers as to why African countries have performed 
so poorly and there is little agreement on what exactly needs to be done, argues Todd J. 
Moss.3 Given the dismal economic showing in the region, this thesis asks what explains 
Africans’ inability to grow economically. However, while searching for the possible 
causes of Africa’s slow economic growth, one cannot understate the importance of the 
dual-economic system that exists in almost all African countries. Tried though some 
leaders have, no African leadership has made great strides in merging the divergent 
national economies into one entity. Consequently, this thesis argues that without 
inclusive efforts to lift national or regional economies as one package, the problem with 
slow growth will likely persist. This thesis examines five proposed causes of slow 
economic growth to determine how they affect the dual economy: the environment, 
institution, policy, culture, and history.  
A. THE TWO ECONOMIES 
The picture of the region’s economy is as complex as it is full of misconceptions. 
The modern or formal economy in Africa is the one that the world recognizes. It 
comprises the export of a few primary commodities including oil, timber, and minerals, 
and the import of mostly manufactured products from non-African markets. But while the 
modern economy is globally recognized, it is also the economy with which the average 
African has marginal engagements. The traditional or informal economy that supports the 
                                                 
1 SSA, “the Region,” and Africa are often used interchangeably. 
2 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development,” Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archive 136, no. 4 (2000): 579–600. 
3 Todd J. Moss, African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2007), 87. 
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majority of Africans is hardly a subject for analysis or efforts for development.4 
Therefore, what constitutes Africa’s economies depends on who is making the analysis.  
Focus on the Republic of Congo (RoC) as an example. The country became 
independent from France in 1960. Although politically independent, the country still 
maintained good relations with the former colonial power on many levels and for various 
reasons. That relation was tested in 1968 when a communist-led coalition overthrew the 
Franco-friendly government. To seize the opportunity of influence for its Cold War 
losses in Congo-Kinshasa, the Soviet Union rushed into Congo-Brazzaville with much 
assistance to the new Marxist leaders.5 For the next few years, Congo-Brazzaville would 
be under communist influence. However, when oil was discovered in the 1970s, France 
expertly outmaneuvered the Soviets to seize control of the oil business in the RoC. It did 
not matter that the country was under communist rule. A deal was struck in which French 
state-owned oil company Elf Aquitaine would pay whoever is in charge in order for the 
company to keep the oil flowing.6  
Congolese political elites knew little about the oil business, argues Howard 
French while quoting a American diplomat saying that “foreign companies define all of 
the terms,” including how much government officials should receive.7 In the end, the 
amount that Elf paid to the government amounted to crumbs when compared to the 
company’s overall profits from the Congolese oil concession, which, according to 
French, formed the higher percentage of the company’s overall profit.8 As he explains it: 
“The Marxist leaders ran a tightly police dictatorship … while they and their foreign 
                                                 
4 The informal economy is also known as the shadow, parallel, underground, or the economy behind 
the scene. This thesis also refers to the informal sector as the indigenous or traditional economy because it 
grew out of tradition. It is the economic system that “follows age-old patterns determined by a complex 
culture that has evolved over thousands of years (James Eggert, Invitation to Economics, 9.) 
5 Congo-Brazzaville is another name for the RoC while Congo-Kinshasa is the other name for 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Brazzaville and Kinshasa are the world’s closest national 
capitals, separated one of the narrowest part of the Congo River. 
6 Howard W. French, A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2005), 74. 
7 Ibid. 
8 French, A Continent for the Taking, 75. 
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partners salted away billions of dollars’ worth of oil revenues in Western banks and 
luxury real estate in Paris, Switzerland and the French Rivera.”9 As Houphouet-Boigny, 
the founding-father of Cote D’Ivoire once said, “I do have assets abroad … What 
sensible man does not keep his assets in Switzerland, the whole world's bank? I would be 
crazy to sacrifice my children's future in this crazy country (La Croix, Paris, March 13, 
1990).”10 This is the typical story of the national economy that the average economic 
analysts are concerned with. In the modern sector of economies, most of these countries 
rely on a few export commodities that the world determines valuable and not much else 
matters.  
The informal or indigenous economy, the one that has existed for generations, is 
rarely the subject of analysis by African or non-African economic experts. According to 
an editorial in Ventures Africa, “This shadow economy is a self-reliant unregulated 
economy that represents a tremendous source for global development going forward.”11 
Yet, this economy is often described as low-value, subsistence-based, tax-free exchanges 
that are out of reach of governments control and unsuitable for development.  
Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer explain that “Informal economic activity is 
pervasive in developing countries. It includes both output produced by firms that are not 
registered with the government, and output by registered firms that is sold for cash and is 
not reported to the government.”12 This informality is more pervasive in Africa than most 
other regions of the world. As the aforementioned Ventures Africa article argues, the 
informal sector account for 75 percent of the employment base in Nigeria, the largest 
economy in the sub-region, representing approximately 37 percent of SSA economy.13  
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 George B. N Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 18. 
11 “The Economy Behind The Scenes,” March 9, 2015, Ventures Africa, http://venturesafrica.com/the-
economy-behind-the-scenes/ 
12 Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer, and National Bureau of Economic Research, “The Unofficial 
Economy in Africa,” (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011). 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16821 
13 “The Economy behind the Scenes,” Ventures Africa. 
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Currently, there are few efforts to see the informal sectors of SSA economies 
evolve beyond what they have always been, but every major stakeholder in SSA 
economies recognizes their influence. Most governments appear to have given-up on 
efforts to formalize the informal sector. Such IMF operatives as Adil Mohommad, Anoop 
Singh, Sonali Jain-Chandra view the sector with contempt. Considering the above 
description, these IMF operatives see the informal sector as one that is deliberately 
concealed to avoid taxes or meeting certain legal labor market standards and 
procedures.14 But regardless of the views and attitudes toward the informal sector of SSA 
economies, it has been and will continue to be the sector that sustains the vast majority of 
Africans. It is difficult to envision how the region’s economies are going to evolve 
without the development of the informal economy. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
James Eggert defines an economy as the manner in which individuals and 
communities survive, reproduce, and evolve by managing limited resources.15 The 
people of SSA have certainly been surviving and reproducing. However, the sub-region 
has not managed to evolve far beyond basic subsistence. Poor healthcare, under-
employment, declining per-capita agricultural output, widespread poverty, and the 
constant need for economic assistance from other parts of the world are the norms. While 
some countries do better than others, SSA on average remains at what economist Jeffrey 
Sachs calls the “pre-commercial stage of [economic] development,” and there are few 
signs that most countries in the region will achieve any kind of transformation beyond 
this stage. Sachs puts the economic levels into four stages: pre-commercial, commercial, 
industrial and knowledge economy. He labels “the commercial stage economy as one 
with basic division of labor between urban and rural settings in which the urban sector 
produces manufactured goods and services, while the rural sectors produce agricultural 
                                                 
14 Anoop Singh et al., “Inclusive Growth, Institutions, and the Underground Economy,” IMF Working 
Paper No. 12/47, February 1, 2012, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25721.0. 
15 James Eggert, Invitation to Economics: Macroeconomics and Microeconomics, 2nd ed. (Mountain 
View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1991). 
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products.”16 The majority of countries in SSA have yet to establish such basic 
prerequisite for economic growth. 
The reality is that apart from South Africa, the urban centers in SSA are 
manufacturing little to nothing. As John Page puts it, “in 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
average share of manufacturing value added in GDP was 10 percent, largely unchanged 
from the 1970s.”17 The vast majority of manufactured goods are shipped from outside of 
the continent where they are produced with more efficiency. Furthermore, agricultural 
products from the rural sectors are generally kept off the shelves in the formal commodity 
stores of the urban centers. In some areas, formal store managers, most of whom are non-
indigenous non-African, prefer to get agricultural products from Brazil, Europe, and other 
non-African markets, when similar products are produced locally.18 Governments are 
generally indifferent to such practices because they can tax the import, while the 
comparable items that are locally grown are mostly sold in open-air market settings 
where states have little control. Under such a condition, establishing the urban-rural labor 
distribution is handicapped, keeping the formal and the traditional economies at a 
perpetual standoff.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
A healthy national or regional economy has, at least since WWII, become the 
primary determinant of societal progress, national strength, and overall human 
development. It is not to say that economic growth will lead to development, but 
historically, economic growth has gone hand-in-hand with better living standards, less 
poverty, and a whole range of other societal benefits. Having a solid economic 
foundation facilitates quick recovery from such occurrences as civil conflicts, which, in 
the last few decades, were common in SSA. A healthy economy makes it possible for 
                                                 
16 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Stages of Economic Development,” Speech at the Chinese Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Beijing, June 19, 2004. 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/china_speech061904.pdf  
17 John Page, “Africa’s Failure to Industrialize: Bad Luck or Bad Policy,” Brookings. November, 
2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/11/19-africa-failure-industrialize-page  
18 Moss, African Development, 236. 
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nations to invest in technology that can help balance such demographic pressures as the 
numerous diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis) that the continent has been plagued 
with for generations. It can help generate funds to invest in machinery to increase 
agricultural production; to develop transportation networks to carry products to various 
parts of the continent; and to invest in research and development to be better prepared to 
respond to a health crisis like ebola.  
The reasons for slow economic growth in Africa have been a major subject of 
debate and concern in Africa and around the world. Since independence, Africans and 
their foreign allies, friends and donors have been looking for an economic model that 
Africans can emulate, but none of the proposed models seems to be a good fit. Beginning 
in the 1960s, leaders of such countries as the DRC, Liberia, and Cote D’Ivoire aligned 
with the West to imitate Western style capitalism. However, it did not take long to 
discover that crony capitalism did not lead to economic growth. Meanwhile, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, and Guinea tried socialism for some time but they also failed. The end results 
were weak economies, constantly in a state of crises, regularly seeking assistance from 
the developed world in the forms of financial rescue, loans, and grants. So bad are the 
economic results in Africa that international financial institutions (IFI) at times dictate 
what some countries are allowed to do.  
While every other region of the world is looking for ways to make markets the 
main driver of progress, the SSA region lags behind in every economic indicator.19 Such 
economic weakness results in much suffering by the larger percentage of ordinary 
Africans. It is only natural that Africa and Africans would want to be as prosperous as 
any other people or regions of the world. The developed and some developing regions 
achieved much success in human development through resource efficiency and market 
effectiveness. Africans can do the same. SSA has enough of a consumer base and the 
materials required are mostly found within the region. Greater economic efficiency in 
managing limited resources to develop markets is not only good for Africans; the world is 
better when Africans prosper. 
                                                 
19 Ayittey, Africa Unchained, 3. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There may well be an infinite number of causes for the lack of economic growth 
in SSA. As previously mentioned, however, causes of slow growth can be analyzed using 
various lenses. Given the divided economy, the primary question to ask is to which 
economy a particular explanation applies. The following reviews of possible reasons 
focuses mainly on the formal economy in which the world expects Africans to operate. 
This segment covers experts’ stances on the environment, institution, policy, history and 
culture. The review will attempt to bridge linkage between the formal and the informal 
economies where such linkages exist.  
1. The Environmental Argument 
The environmental causes of SSA’s lack of economic growth are probably the 
oldest arguments presented by the experts. Adam Smith predicted Africa’s economic 
destiny in his 1776 publication of The Wealth of Nations, claiming that the African 
geography generally condemns it to stagnant growth.20 Today, however, the 
environmental logic is professed primarily by American economist Jeffrey Sachs.21 The 
idea is that the SSA environment itself is a deterrent to economic growth. Whether it is 
the land, the climate, the geography, the general ecosystem, or such associated 
demographic pressures as diseases of the tropics, Africa is destined to economic 
misfortune no matter what. Daron Acemoglu, Paul Collier, William Easterly, Ross 
Levine and countless other economists refer to Sachs studies and conclusions of the 
environmental effects on African economies and they all agree that the environment 
causes are valid. However, these experts arrive at different conclusions as to the level of 
impact the environment has on economic development. One point of agreement is that 
diffusion of advanced technology, particularly in agriculture and medicine, can help 
mitigate the environmental challenges that are said to contribute to Africa’s lack of 
economic growth.  
                                                 
20 Sachs, “Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development,” 579. 
21 Ibid. Also see Sachs, “Tropical Underdevelopment” (NBER Working Paper No. 8119) Feb. 2001. 
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2. The Institutional Argument 
The second cause of slow economic growth considers the effects of weak 
institutions on African economies. This is an explanation proposed primarily by the 
Daron Acemoglu. To Acemoglu, “It cannot be that the climate, ecology, or diseases of 
the tropical areas have condemned these countries to poverty today, because these same 
areas … were richer than the temperate areas 500 years ago.”22 Something happened to 
cause this reversal of economic fortunes and those who share Acemoglu’s mindset point 
to the set-up of colonial era institutions of resource extraction as the cause of the reversal. 
Douglas North is another famous expert to whose work on institutions most 
analysts refer when examining institutional effects on economies. According to North, 
“Institutions set the rules of the game. In so doing, institutions define and limit the set of 
choices of individuals and reduce the uncertainties involved in human interaction. The 
economic performance of a country depends critically on its institutional 
arrangements.”23 But the institutional argument is an area where the dilemma of the dual-
economy comes into play in a major way. When analysts assess African institutions, they 
usually refer to institutional effects on the modern economies since the traditional 
economies in SSA are usually out of the reach of the modern institutions that the world 
recognizes.  
3. The Policy Argument  
The undisputed consensus among economists and economic analysts alike is that 
African leaders adopted the wrong economic models and policies once in charge of their 
national affairs. So desperate were some African leaders to steer their newly independent 
countries away from colonial domination that they were willing to try anything not 
associated with capitalism. Consequently, a command economy under socialist 
                                                 
22 Daron Acemoglu, “Root Causes: A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of Institutions in 
Economic Development,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 4th ed. Edited by Patrick H. 
O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 157. 
23 Hongying Wang, “Informal institutions and foreign investment in China,” The Pacific Review, 13:4, 
525–556, DOI: 10.1080/09512740010004269. 
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tendencies was the approach chosen by most. As Ghanaian economist George Ayittey 
states: 
The courtship and fascination with socialism emerged during the struggle 
for political independence and freedom from colonial rule in the 1950s. 
Many African nationalists harbored deep distrust and distaste for 
capitalism, which was falsely identified by most African nationalist 
leaders as an extension of colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, 
freedom from colonial rule was synonymous with freedom from 
capitalism … having just emerged from the colonial era, all African 
leaders were naturally poised to jealously protect the hard-won 
sovereignty and to strenuously guard against another episode of colonial 
and foreign exploitation. This was only possible if the state maintained a 
large presence in the economy.24 
Unfortunately, such policies did not payout for the newly independent African 
countries. For economist like Paul Collier, the stagnant economic posture that started in 
the 1980s is correlated to increased authoritarianism and dictatorial tendencies of African 
leaders since the 1970s. African rulers imposed extensive tariffs and quantitative trade 
restrictions that severely limited international exchanges,25 argued Collier. Ayittey 
further explains that: 
With the passage of time, state control began to wreak havoc on African 
economies … prices control, regardless of where they were imposed, 
created artificial shortages. If the free market price of a bag of maize is 
$5.00 and the government fixes its price at $1.00, the immediate effect is 
to artificially cheapen the commodity and increase its demand. But it has 
the opposite effect on supply. By forcing suppliers to accept a price lower 
that what they were receiving before, it discourages production and reduce 
supplies. The combination of increased demand and reduced supplies 
produce the shortage.26 
These are the kinds of policies that analysts claimed to have destroyed African 
economic potentials in the early years since independence. By the same token, many of 
the authors fail to remind readers that Western experts, governments, and such global 
                                                 
24 Ayittey, Africa Unchained, 61. 
25 Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, “Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1999): 3–22, American Economic Association Stable, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646982  
26 Ayittey, Africa Unchained, 30. 
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entities as the World Bank and IMF have always been present and actively anchored 
these African despots in steering their countries’ economies to disaster.  
4. Africa’s Economic History 
The refusal by the traditional sector to be conquered by the imported imperialist 
economic system is at the core of Africa’s economic problems. As Goran Hyden 
explains, “economic history is largely the story of how to capture the peasants. Nowhere 
in the world have other social classes risen to power without making the many small and 
independent rural producers subordinate to their demands.”27 This is not the case in 
Africa. In the formal sectors where such primary commodities as petroleum and minerals 
are keys elements, governing elites and foreign enterprises are in control. But when it 
comes to the informal sector, the rural farmers are in charge of their own destiny. They 
have much freedom to control how and what they produce. This is the way it has been for 
generations except for the brief colonial era.  
“Africa is the only continent where the peasants have not been captured by other 
social classes,” says Hyden.28 To make matters worse, low population and lots of excess 
land only decrease the likelihood of peasant control. Each family unit produces enough 
for its needs. They all are independent and require little from governments that they often 
see as alien elements to fear and evade. Such sentiment is a lasting legacy of the colonial 
era when colonial administrators, through proxy traditional chiefs specially trained by the 
colonials, imposed excessive force to get the peasants to produce agricultural excess. In 
the struggle for independence, it was these colonially constructed chiefs, not the white 
settlers, who were at the front end of the Africa spear. There began the duel between the 
formal and the informal sectors that lingers in post-colonial Africa. 
                                                 
27 Göran Hydén, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 9. 
28 Ibid. 
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5. The Culture Argument 
The cultural argument is one area that most economists and Africa economic 
analysts shy away from. To some analysts, culture makes little difference in economic 
development.29 The continuous portrayal of African mannerism as one stuck in custom, 
rejecting development, is nothing more than misguided prejudice. To extend this 
portrayal would suggest that Africans are poor and economically underdeveloped 
precisely because their cultures are African. There is little empirical evidence for such 
supposition. 
Other analysts shy away from discussing cultural effects on economies because 
they do not want to offend. Many took note Samuel Huntington’s observation that the 
average GDP for South Korea and Ghana was nearly the same in 1960. In 2000, observed 
Huntington, the South Korean economy far outperformed that of Ghana. He concluded 
that such deviation in economic outcome resulted because South Koreans culture valued 
thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and above all – discipline.30 
Ghanaian cultural values were different, if Huntington’s analysis has any merit. 
Apparently such beliefs are still generally accepted among many economic experts 
because despite the various other factors that could have made a difference in 
Huntington’s observation; many experts continually compare African economies with 
that of the so-called Asian tigers (S. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia).  
Those analysts, like the editor-in-chief of the African Sun Times, Chika Onyeani, 
who highlight the strong correlation between dismal economic showing and the economic 
tendencies of people of African descent, receive much criticism for their views.31 An 
African of Nigerian origin, Onyeani does not shy away from emphasizing his 
observations about the lack of economic progress of people of African descent in 
comparison to others. The African, he argues, is a consumer race that has been led to 
                                                 
29 Jean-Michel Severino, Africa’s Moment (translate by David Fernbach), (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011), 60–63. 
30 Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E Harrison, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000) xiii. 
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believe that production of commodities to exchange in the global marketplace is 
something to be left to other people. “I am frightened and disgusted at the same time, at a 
people who produce nothing and consume everything that others produce,” says 
Onyeani.32 Whether it is by design or accident, to discuss it or not, culture matters and 
may very well be an obstacle to economic development in Africa. 
E. METHOD, SCOPE, AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
1. Method  
The bulk of the thesis focuses on critical examination of the theorized causes of 
Africa’s slow economic growth. Each of the selected cause is assessed to determine how 
it influences the dual-economic system. This is important because in such divided system, 
remedies to the lack of growth must address all economic sectors independently and this 
is counter-productive. It makes solving the problems event harder since the economic 
sector that supports most Africans is the sector that receives the least attention. As 
indicated previously, African economies cannot evolve to follow-on stages of economic 
development in such an extreme bifurcated fashion.  
2. Scope 
The thesis will take a sub-regional approach focusing on all of SSA even though 
the sub-region may be further divided into geographical areas: East, West, Central, and 
South. The thesis takes the regional approach because, except for a few anomalies, the 
general economic posture of countries in SSA is similar. Some countries—Gambia, 
Togo, Benin, Rwanda, Burundi and Swaziland—are small in size, population, and 
economy; while such others, as Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and DRC are larger, but the 
economic posture of countries large or small is the same. Even the economy of the 
Republic of South Africa (RSA), one of the larger and most modern in the region follows 
the general trend because daily life and economic status of the average native South 
African is not much different than that of any others in the sub-region.  
                                                 
32 Onyeani, Capitalist Nigger, 5. 
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3. Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized into four main chapters or categories of analysis. The next 
three chapters examine the main causes for Africa’s slow economic growth, while the 
follow-on chapter discusses a well-documented recent shift in SSA’s economic growth 
trajectory. Chapter II covers the environmental causes of slow growth. The central issue 
discussed in this segment is the land and its lack of productive capacity. The central 
theme revolves around tropical climate. The belief is that tropical climates are prone to 
economic underdevelopment and recent comparisons between hot and temperate climates 
in the last few centuries seem to indicate that cooler climates generally do better 
economically than areas with hot weather. Since the vast majority of the landmass of 
SSA is located in the tropics, the chapter considers whether geography and weather 
explains Africa’s slow economic growth.  
Chapter III examines the effects of weak institutions and bad economic policies 
on slow growth. It combines the institutions and policy since both explanations can be 
considered tools of economic management. They are examined together since they 
overlap in many ways. It takes institutions to make the policies and it takes policies to 
lay-out how institutions will function. 
Chapter IV examines Africa’s economic history from pre-modern to present 
conditions. The chapter combines history with culture because in most ways, historical 
experiences of a society shape its culture, and the short colonial experience has been the 
single most important cultural transformative experiment in the continent’s modern 
history. Central to this chapter is the fact that the modern capitalist economy was 
introduced to Africa during the colonial era and this system, it appears, has not yet taken 
hold in the region. The traditional economy that has sustained Africans for generations 
seems to be determined to resist encroachment by a foreign system that has consistently 
attempted to subjugate it. Can African culture explain this resistance? Economic history 
should provide the details.  
Chapter V examines the recent economic growth trends that have dominated 
Africa’s economic analysis and the headlines in the last decade. Apparently, some 
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analysts believe that the era of economic stagnation is over and the continent is on the 
verge of a massive transformation. There are three main elements that analysts claim to 
be driving the growth trend. These elements are an increase in the price of export 
commodities, urbanization, and growth in the service sector—particularly in the 
communication and banking.  
The thesis concludes with a general regrouping of the factors of slow growth in 
SSA. Key among these factors is the general history of economic isolation, 
mismanagement of national resources, in addition to the region’s history of unfavorable 
foreign relations. In the end, the thesis provides some recommendations for internal as 
well as external factions that have a stake in the development of the SSA’s economies. 
Additionally, it makes some recommendations to future researchers who may want to 
address what the private sector, governments, and the international community can do to 
reduce the informality that seems to represent a major obstacle to economic development 




II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION 
This chapter evaluates the environmental causes of Africa’s lack of economic 
growth. The main focus of this chapter is the low agricultural output of the land, for 
which, the environment is said to be the cause. Under the environmental logic, the low 
agricultural output is due to SSA’s hot climate and its effects on the land and the labor 
force. This is a particular problem for the traditional economy since agriculture forms the 
backbone of that sector.  
Comparative analysis does show tropical economies to be generally poorer and 
less advanced than those in temperate climate.33 The question is whether this condition is 
by nature or by design. Experts like Sachs who believe nature to be the cause refer to 
climate and the general ecology for explanations. Those, like Acemoglu, who believe this 
condition to be by design, look to institutional evolution while others point to economic 
policy choices of the various African leaders. 
The geography argument concludes that because of its location, Africa will not 
benefit much from global trade. This consideration is something that mostly concerns the 
formal economic sectors in SSA. These sectors rely heavily on their connections with the 
global economy more so than with the local or traditional. The situation is worse for 
landlocked countries that do not have access to the sea.34 Given that the formal 
economies in SSA countries were designed to maintain economic linkage with the former 
colonial powers, the situation became even more challenging once countries gained 
independence from the metropoles.  
 
                                                 
33 John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, “Geography and Economic Development,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 6849 (1998), International Regional Science Review 22, no. 2 (August 1999), 
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34 Severino, Africa’s Moment, 56–57. 
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A. THE MAIN FOCUS 
The lack of agricultural productivity is ambiguous in that some experts argue that 
the sub-Saharan part of the continent possesses sufficient arable lands to produce enough 
food to feed Africa’s current population. As Amadou Sy puts it, “Africa accounts for 
about 60 percent of the world’s arable land, and most of its countries do not achieve 25 
percent of their potential yield.35 The claim 60 percent of world’s arable land is 
questionable; however, according to a 1981 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
study, “Africa can feed herself. Even without using any modern farming techniques such 
as pesticides and with only the most casual approach to maintaining the soil … Africa 
presently has the potential to feed a population three times as large as that now living on 
the continent.”36 Despite this claim, however, Africa is today a net food importer. As Sy 
puts it, “The region spent more than $30 billion to import basic grains in 2011 according 
to the FAO. For every $1 it earns today in agricultural exports (mainly coffee, cotton, and 
cocoa), the region spends nearly $2 on agricultural imports, mainly food.”37 Past 
incidences of mass starvation and worries about feeding the growing African population 
are issues of constant concerns for Africans and their foreign supporters.  
“Hunger remains a persistent problem in Africa,” says Ayittey, continuing that, 
“At the beginning of 2003, an estimated 25 million Africans required emergency food 
aid.”38 Not even seasonal droughts can explain this phenomenon, noted former Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Director-General Jacques Diouf in 2003: “even where 
there is no drought or other acute crisis, about 200 million Africans suffer from chronic 
hunger.”39 The international Food Policy Research Institute also projected in its 2020 
Global Food Outlook that the problem of chronic hunger on the African continent will 
                                                 
35 Amadou Sy, “What Do We Know about the Chinese Land Grab in Africa?” Brookings Institute, 
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39 Ibid. 
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increase.40 This gives the impression that Africa indeed has an agricultural productivity 
problem. As far as the environmental explanation is concerned, the main problem for the 
lack of agro-productivity is the ecology—particularly the climate and its association with 
the land. 
Demographic challenges of the labor force also contribute to the lack of 
agricultural productivity. The hot climate causes undue harm to the human body. Such 
tropical diseases as malaria only compound the problem. Infant mortality is high due in 
part to undernutrition that is a direct result of agricultural underproduction. Life 
expectancy is low due to years of sickness. The end result is a cycle of poverty that only 
increases fertility. But since life expectancy is low, countries end up with a working 
population that is usually young, inexperienced, with few prospects in life.  
B. THE CLIMATE 
The main issue within the environmental explanation is climate. Most of SSA 
falls between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn at roughly 23 degrees north and south 
latitude from the equator (see Figure 1).41 Though land features within the area vary, the 
areas located in the global tropics are known to be among the hottest on the planet. Such 
high temperature has several effects on soil and laborers. The heat affects soil conditions, 
rendering the land less productive, the same way it affects human health because of the 
various tropical diseases tropical area supports. As mentioned earlier, if the land and 
people cannot efficiently produce, economic growth is off to a bad start.  
  
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.  GDP per Capita, 1995 
 
Source: John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, and the President and 
Fellows of Harvard College “Geography and Economic Development,” CID Working 
Paper No. 1, Center for International Development at Harvard University, 1999, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/69366/1250274/version/1/file/001.pdf. 
Economic experts have historically placed agriculture at the center of the initial 
phase of economic growth.42 Therefore, moving up the economic ladder requires a 
society to first and foremost have a grip of its agriculture. Food productivity is what 
makes the difference in why some poor countries grew and other decline, argues Sachs.43 
The idea is for food production to match or outpace population growth. Accordingly, 
increased agricultural output through more efficient farming methods lessens the amount 
of labor required on the farms. As a result, more of the labor resource transitions from the 
agricultural sectors to the urban settings where higher wages, technological advances, and 
manufacturing are the norms.44 This is exactly what happened in a developed country 
like the United States. Farmers made up about 90 percent of U.S. labor force in 1790. By 
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2005), 69. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Sachs, End of Poverty, 36. 
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the year 2000, that figure was less than 2 percent.45 In keeping with this logic, Africans 
have definitely been surging to the urban centers as will be discussed in the last chapter. 
However, although agricultural output for Africa has overall increase in recent decades, it 
has not kept pace with population growth. Additionally, very little manufacturing takes 
place in the African urban centers where unemployment is already high. 
1. The Effects of Climate on Land 
Low agricultural output is the primary contribution of the land problems. 
According to Sachs, “High temperatures cause bacteria in the soil to decompose soil 
organic materials as a very high rate, causing the soil to lose nutrients and physical 
structure more easily.”46 Among the many associated problems of land and temperature, 
Sachs also cited reduction in net photosynthesis, high rates of water evaporation, tropical 
pests, and various plants and livestock diseases.47 In a predominantly agrarian society 
like Africa, such a condition is definitely problematic. More food means healthier 
individuals who can reproduce to increase population, which, as many analysts agree, is a 
major step to economic growth.  
2. The Effects of Climate on the Labor Force 
The second problem relates to tropical climate is its effects on the human body. 
Poor health, combined with undernutrition due to the low productivity of the land only 
increases the burden of diseases. According to Sachs, “the tropical environment is much 
more supportive of infectious disease, both because bacterial pathogens flourish in warm 
environments, and because such key vector-borne diseases as malaria require warm 
temperature for the survival and infectivity of the intermediate vectors (see Figure 2).”48 
The heat already poses excessive stress on the human body, and, when recurring illnesses 
are factored in the equation, the body simply caves to the pressures. Consequently, very 
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few people want to spend long hours at work under such perilous conditions. “It is no 
accident that slave labor has historically been associated with tropical and semi-tropical 
climes,” says Landes, continuing that, “The aim is to shift the work and pain to those not 
able to say no.”49 There is no arguing with such logic, especially if one adds the 
HIV/AIDS phenomenon, dengue fever, and the periodic disease outbreaks of, for 
example, ebola and cholera that Africans seem to be unable to control.  
Figure 2.  Malaria Index, 1994 
 
Source: John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, “Geography and 
Economic Development,” NBER Working Paper No. 6849 (1998), Center for 
International Development at Harvard University http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
content/download/69366/1250274/version/1/file/001.pdf.  
3. Climate and Economic Posture 
Based on the tropical underdevelopment logic, economies are generally worse in 
places where year-round high temperature is hotter compared to places with cooler 
climate. One of the ways to compare the economic capacities of two societies or regions 
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is to examine the differences in average income. “Locate the poorest places in the world 
where the per-capital incomes are less than one-twentieth those in the United States, you 
will find almost all of them close to the equator, in very hot regions … where, by 
definition, tropical diseases are widespread,”50 says Daron Acemoglu. Could this be an 
accident or a natural phenomenon?  
In his research of tropical underdevelopment, Sachs demonstrates that there is a 
strong relationship between low income and high temperatures when compared to zones 
with cooler temperatures. It is not so much a matter of latitude or distance from the 
equator that is being explained, argued Sachs, but that “countries with the same latitude 
can have different climate patterns because of influence of land masses, wind patterns, 
and ocean currents.”51 The one thing places that places of similar latitude have in 
common, however, is the general temperature. Consequently, income in northeastern 
United States is higher than the south because the general climate in the north is cooler.  
The colonial experience cannot explain tropical underdevelopment because 
according to Sachs, “tropical Latin America had gained independence by the 1820s, 
without decisive breakthroughs in development as of the late 21st.”52 Accordingly, Sachs 
would argue that the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is the most modern economy on the 
continent not because of its colonial history of unfair distribution of the country’s wealth 
to the settler community, but because the climate is cooler. What Sachs did not 
emphasize was that tropical Latin America, like near all of SSA, developed from a 
resource extraction arrangement. Chile, Argentina, and Southern Brazil are cooler and 
doing better economically, yes, but these are settler colonies where people of European 
descent make-up more than 50 percent of the population.53 As will be detailed in the next 
chapter, European settler communities adopted institutions that support economic 
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development while extractive institutions that invite economic reversal were the norm in 
the non-settler colonies. 
C. THE GEOGRAPHY 
In his book, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith predicted that some countries 
and regions of the world are simply not in the best location to benefit from market-based 
development—particularly the benefits of market globalization.54 Most, if not all of 
inland Africa is destined to economic misfortune, predicted Smith: “There are in Africa 
none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas as in Europe, the 
Mediterranean and Euxine Sea in both Europe and Asia … to carry maritime commerce 
into the interior of that great continent.”55 Given such logic, landlocked countries are 
even worse-off than countries with a water coast. The geographic logic concludes that 
Africa’s dismal economic showing and failures to fully take advantage of globalization of 
economies are due to its location and physical land features, notably the lack of major 
waterways.  
If the geography explanation has any merit, it would mean that Africa’s economic 
growth and development depends on the region’s trade with economies of other regions. 
Never mind that countries in the region are not trading among each other, such trade is 
unlikely to bring any major economic benefit. Such logic is in keeping with the common 
tendency that the modern economy that relates to the outside world is the only economy 
that deserves attention.  
D. EXPERT ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION 
When analyzing the environmental causes of slow growth, contemporary experts 
primarily refer to Sachs’ research. However, former head of Australia’s bureau of 
statistics, Dennis Trewin, notes that “the time period used for much of his [Sachs] 
analysis ended in 1995 and [though his analysis] correctly represented the situation at that 
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time.”56 Trewin’s revision of Sach’s data indicates that the growth rate was indeed lower 
in tropical zones between 1820 and 1995, in the same period when Europe underwent 
two industrial revolutions.57 Consistent with the latest GDP trend, the World Bank’s 
average real GDP from 1995 to 2010 shows 5.3 percent for Africa, south of the Sahara; a 
percentage that is slightly above world average.58 Trewin’s statistical analysis also 
accounts for all zones in the tropics including countries in South and Southeast Asia 
where some countries experienced their own economic growth take-off in the last few 
decades. 
Daron Acemoglu and Paul Collier also highlight, and in some respect agree with 
Sachs’ environmental assessment of the effects of geographical and demographic 
pressures on African economies. The curse of tropical diseases and their effects on health 
and soil conditions do render people and land less productive. This condition is 
particularly problematic since the agro-sector is still the largest employment sector in 
most of Africa. These effects are further aggravated by declining rainfall since the1960s, 
says Collier.59 But both Collier and Acemoglu also argue that the environmental effects 
on African economies only show a correlation—not causation—to slow economic 
growth. Landes also notes that “it is a mistake to see geography as destiny[;] … science 
and technology is the key.”60 For these authors, the limitations to Africa’s economic 
performance are manmade. They are either the result of bad economic policies or 
ineffective institutions.  
To his credit, however, Sachs also argues that diffusion of technology from more 
technologically advanced areas, particularly in healthcare and the agro-sector, could help 
overcome some of the effects of tropical underdevelopment that facilitate low economic 
output. As Collier argues, technology can transform nature into an asset, and “a formula 
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that the world as a whole, and the poorest countries in particular, must master [is that] 
nature + technology + regulation = prosperity.”61 Technological advances have clearly 
not taken hold in most of Africa except for imported technology in the communication 
and service industries that is now fueling the recent growth to be discussed in the last 
chapter.  
E. THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY  
The distribution of fertile and non-fertile lands among African countries depended 
on the inherited arbitrary borders created by non-Africans. Countries like Niger and 
Mauritania are mostly desert with minimal land available for agriculture, while in Liberia 
and Cote D’Ivoire, agricultural lands are in abundance. On a regional economic outlook, 
disparities in arable land distribution between countries should not be a problem. With 
minimal coordination, Cote D’Ivoire can easily reinforce Niger’s agricultural shortfalls in 
exchange for livestock from the north, and that’s exactly what has been happening for 
generations, although on a small, non-industrial scale. Livestock from Mali and Burkina 
Faso continually make their way to Abidjan and Accra in exchange for agro-products 
mostly in the informal economy, but these transactions are not captured in economic 
estimates. There are few to no major multi-state corporations in place to make an industry 
out of the informal markets exchanges. If these exchanges were organized within a multi-
national economy of scale, capable of developing ways to improved production and 
distribution, the probability of growth would be much higher in the region. As Rafael La 
Porta and Andrei Shleifer states, “The source of economic growth and transformation to 
modernity is the creation of large formal firms … Informal firms operate in the so-called 
dual economy, providing subsistence to their owners and employees, but not being 
productive enough to become a source of economic progress.”62 Such economy of scale, 
supported by coordinated efforts among governments and regional economic planners is 
clearly missing in Africa, and this is a direct result of the fixation on improving foreign 
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economic models that cannot relate to economic practices that have existed for 
generations. 
F. CLIMATE AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
Despite the general consensus among the experts on the validity of the 
environmental causes, low agricultural productivity due to climate cannot tell the whole 
story of economic stagnation in Africa. Although generally hot, the sub-Saharan Africa 
landmass is enormous with varied terrain features. There are the tropical forest areas, the 
sub-tropical deserts, the Savannahs, etc. Some areas, for example, coastal West and 
Central Africa in the Gulf of Guinea, are known to be a generally damp with recurring 
rainfall and tropical weather suitable for agriculture.63 According to World Bank country 
overview (last updated April 2015), the DRC alone has an estimated 80 billion hectares 
of arable lands that, if properly cultivated, have the potential to sustain one billion 
Africans—nearly the entire population of SSA.64  
Part of the problem is that large-scale, industrial farming in the more productive 
areas of the continent has yet to take hold. Whether by design or the inability of the agro-
industries, large-scale farms are few and those that exist normally are concentrated on the 
production of a few cash crops for overseas export. But even if industrial farming were to 
take hold, the management and transportation infrastructure required to move agricultural 
products from one part the sub-continent to the other is minimal.  
To compare Africa with Asia, Sachs explains that “the Asian countryside is 
densely populated, with relatively extensive road network that can carry fertilizer to the 
farms and farm output to the markets.”65 In contrast, “the African countryside is much 
less densely populated, with an absence of roads to transport fertilizers and crops. 
Farmers do not use fertilizers on food crops, and depend on rainfall rather than 
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irrigation.”66 To make matters worse, countries like Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and 
Cameroon are looking to ship their agricultural excess to their former colonial power or 
anywhere in Europe where they can get Euros for their produce. These countries are not 
programing agricultural endeavors to ship produce to Burkina Faso, northern Mali, or the 
entire North African region which imports food mostly from Europe. Agricultural lands 
in the Congo mostly sit idle, unused, because farmers are not going to labor to produce 
products when there is no guaranteed market worthy of their cultivation efforts. 
When it comes to the labor challenges, it is clear that diseases—environmentally 
associated or not—are problems of major concerns. But while diseases can keep labor 
resources in check, various analysts highlight that the poverty resulting from such 
conditions also encourage high fertility in human reproduction. Infant mortality in SSA is 
high, but Africa’s population is still reproducing faster than all other regions of the 
world.67 As France’s former Director of Agence Française de Développement states, 
“Cote d’Ivoire had only 11 inhabitants per square kilimotre in 1960; it has nearly 70 
today [2011], and will be 110 by 2050. If Britain had undergone the same population 
growth … it would today count 285 million inhabitants.”68 Consequently, it is not that a 
lack of labor that hinders economic growth, but rather the lack of economic development 
renders the labor force inactive. Underdeveloped healthcare and human habits are also 
primary contributors to the disease environment. Ultimately, economies are not stagnant 
because workers are dying of common diseases since for every soon-to-be sick worker; 
three are produced for the replacement.  
G. GEOGRAPHY AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
The geography limitations on growth would make sense if SSA’s formal economy 
were the only concern. The modern economy after all is the sector that is most connected 
and dependent on world markets. Accordingly, it would also suggest that economic 
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growth in SSA is dependent on its trade and connections with economies of other 
regions. This is the typical mindset of the analysts who only focus on what Africans have 
to trade with non-African markets while intra-Africa trade is ignored. African leadership 
is increasingly waking-up to understanding the need for intra-Africa trade. But given the 
inability to reconcile the dual national economies, reaching the point where controlled 
intra-Africa trade is the norms would be a long time coming.  
The geography argument does not impact the traditional sector as much as it does 
the modern economy. Apart from the few cash-crops traditionally exchanged on global 
markets, geography do not mean much for the indigenous economy since people in that 
sector have been self-sustained for generations. But if geography does make a difference 
in overall economic growth, it would either mean that the traditional economy practiced 
in Africa for generations is unsuitable to growth or Africans need to further develop intra-
Africa trade to locally grow before going global. It is what the United States did during 
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III. INSTITUTION AND POLICY  
While the harshness of the environment is often considered the oldest explanation 
of Africa’s lack of economic growth, weak institutions and bad economic policies are 
among the most popular. As noted earlier, management is the category of economic 
resources needed to coordinate the functions of all other resources, and institutions and 
policies are two of the primary tools used to this end. The institutions and policy causes 
of slow growth are at the heart of the dual-economy dilemma since these tools of 
economic enhancement seem to be applicable only to the formal economic sector, while 
they have little to no influence in the traditional. This is not surprising, however, because 
the institutions and policies that African governments have adopted are foreign implants 
introduced to Africa during the colonial era. This chapter examines what institutions and 
policies mean to Africa and African economies. It takes a historical approach in the 
evaluation because, until the colonial era, institutions were traditional and policies were 
unwritten and commonly understood among members of the indigenous, stateless people 
of SSA.  
The main focus for the institutional argument is the failure of Africans to 
transform these institutions and adapt to changing economic realities. Outdated 
institutional practices continue unabated because small groups of petty elites do not see 
the need for adjustments. For policies, the original errors took place when African leaders 
adopted prepackaged, foreign economic development models that were totally out of 
touch with on-the-ground economic realities. Essentially, these leaders were looking for 
quick fixes to the creation and development of modern economies when the prerequisite 
for such grand schemes were absent. It was like trying to create in a decade what it took 
more technologically advanced societies a century or more to accomplish. For what they 
are worth, the modern institutions and policies that most African societies are now 
struggling with are the same tools through which the international community relates to 
Africa. One way or another, Africans are going to have to make them work because the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) in particular hold huge sway in Africa’s 
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economic destiny. As long as Africans remain dependent on the international system, 
modern institutions and policies will have to be the way forward.  
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT  
To clarify why formally rich regions of the world are now poor, Patrick H O’Neil 
and Ronald Rogowski summarize Acemoglu’s research on institution stating that: 
Because Europeans sought to plunder those richer regions, they 
established predatory institutions (rapacious governments, insecure 
property rights) that have often survived down to the present day. When 
Europeans colonized originally poorer and less densely settled regions 
(Australia, North America) … they could augment wealth only by 
attracting settlers, minimizing the burden of government, and establishing 
clear property rights. The result had been a “reversal of fortune,” in which 
originally poor regions wound up with good institutions, rapid economic 
growth, and ultimate wealth, while originality rich regions inherited bad 
institutions that impoverished them.69 
The concept or meaning of institutions in Africa is complex. The first misconception to 
set aside is that there is just one institutional inclination in the SSA region. Some experts 
conclude that there are two types: the modern Western institutions created during 
colonialism and the indigenous or traditional African institutions. Others claim that there 
are three, adding the informal institution, a hybrid system that allow Africans to transition 
back and forth between the traditional and the modern.70  
The indigenous is the homegrown institution which, at times, seems to be in 
conflict with formal. It is the institution “which has historically been castigated as 
backward and primitive,” says Ayittey, “yet it works—albeit at a low level of efficiency; 
otherwise, it would not have been able to sustain its [African] people throughout the 
centuries.”71 On the other hand, the modern or formal institutions constitute models 
adopted or enforced on Africans during and after the colonial era. They are the 
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institutional models to which the indigenous institutions were supposed to evolve, but 
never did. Ayittey continues that, “Most of Africa’s problems emanate from its modern 
sector. They spill over onto the traditional, causing disruptions, dislocations, and 
claiming innocent victims” in the process.72 These institutions were passed on to 
Africans as colonial administrators prepared to leave. Since decolonization, however, 
European institutions have evolved, but Africans maintain the same institutional practices 
as they were passed on. 
Today, Africans are supposed to operate within the confines of the imported 
Eurocentric institutions. The problem is that only a minority segment of Africans 
subscribes to these imported institutions. This condition has created an institutional 
nightmare as the minority sector, mostly situated in niche sectors in the urban centers, 
tries to cope with the imported institutions while the majority of Africans, still living in 
the rural settings, cling to their traditional institutions. However, it is not by nature that 
the bifurcation of indigenous and modern institutions came to be. For Mahmood 
Mandani, it was by design.73 The modern institutions were not made to regulate the 
societal affairs of native Africans. They were established to regulate human interaction in 
the urban settings where most of the European settlers operated.74 The rural sectors were 
left to the behest of traditional chiefs, trained and appointed by colonial administrators to 
manage the natives. In essence, if the modern institutions of today are unable to 
contribute to Africa’s economic growth, they were never designed for such a purpose.  
The introduction of the imported institutions appears to have ushered in a lasting 
shift of institutional tendencies in Africans. While various analysts describe Africa’s 
indigenous societies to have had cultural institutions that promote practices similar to 
what we now call democracy, institutional tendencies in contemporary Africa are 
anything but democratic. Ayeitty describes the modern sector as a “meretricious 
fandango of imported or borrowed institutions that are little understood by the [African] 
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elites … and the end product is a mass confusion.”75 From their inception, they were 
designed to benefit their foreign inventors, and later, the African elites who would 
replace them.  
Acemoglu reinforces this stance by stating that, “Historical evidence suggests that 
Europeans indeed pursued very different colonization strategies, with very different 
associated institutions, in various colonies” depending on what economic advantages 
there were to gain.76 He continues that “at one extreme, Europeans set up exclusively 
extractive institutions, as exemplified by the Belgian colonization of the Congo, slave 
plantations in the Caribbean, and forced labor systems in the mines of Central 
America.”77 Simply put, the European colonists never intended to settle permanently in 
these places. These are the hot, malaria ridden environments that Sachs and others 
discussed in the preceding chapter. Europeans conquered these places to extract primary 
resources, with the express purpose of making a profit. Acemoglu explains it best when 
he states:  
In places where Europeans did not settle and cared little about aggregate 
output and the welfare of the population, in places where there was a large 
population that could be coerced and employed cheaply in mines or in 
agriculture or simply taxed, in places where there were resources to be 
extracted, Europeans pursued the strategy of setting up extractive 
institutions …. In those colonies, there were no constraints on the power 
of the elites (which were typically the Europeans themselves or their 
allies) and no civil or property rights for the majority of the population; in 
fact, many of them were forced into labor or enslaved.78  
At the other extreme, “Europeans founded a number of colonies where they 
created settler societies, replicating—and often improving—the European form of 
institutions … primary examples of this mode of colonization includes Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States,”79 says Acemoglu. One can attest that most of these 
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are places where the climate is generally temperate or resembles that of Europe. One can 
also include the southern cone of SSA on the list of chosen settler colonies as the area is 
generally cooler than the rest of the sub-continent. It is a condition that may help to 
explain why Zimbabwe and the RSA were among the last to gain their independence 
from European domination. Even in these locations, however, the institutions were not 
supposed to help develop or manage the affairs of native inhabitants. This point helps 
explain the apartheid systems in South Africa.  
This colonial institution legacy lingers in Africa, manifested perhaps most clearly 
in the fact that most African economies depend on the same few primary extractive 
resources determined valuable by the former colonial powers. In addition to the usually 
small, formal economic sector, these primary resources are the only things considered 
when making economic analysts and forecast. Little focus is put on developing the local, 
informal, or indigenous institutions.  
African leaders continued to operate through institutions that are non-democratic, 
and designed only to extract resources for shipment to non-African markets. Better 
exercise of institutions can help to accelerate economic growth, but changing the 
institutional culture adopted from colonial rules would affect the redistribution of the 
wealth which could lessen the share of the powerful African elite. Only if there were 
some way to compensate for these losses might the African political bourgeoisie be 
inclined to support institutional reforms. As Acemoglu states, “Any reform to the system, 
however beneficial for the country as a whole, would be a direct threat to them 
[elites].”80 Like Acemuglu, Ayittey affirms that these elites are not interested in any kind 
of reform, “in fact, it would be economically and politically suicidal for them to do so.”81 
Accordingly, if Africa’s modern institutions contribute little to SSA’s economic growth; 
it is exactly how the African political elites want it to be. So what are the options? 
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One of the institutional options that some analysts suggest is to go back to the 
origins and develop the indigenous institutions.82 However, it is uncertain how much a 
difference such endeavor will bring, especially at this late stage of global economic 
development. The battle for primacy between the traditional and modern institutions took 
place even before the African countries became independent. For years leading up to 
independence, the colonially constructed traditional chiefs struggled with those who Basil 
Davidson calls the new nationalists who were in favor of maintaining the modern system 
of institutions.83 Those in favor of keeping the modern institutions emerge victorious 
because it is believed that the indigenous institutions could not compete under the 
modern conditions.  
Application of Western style democracy is the second offer to the way forward 
with African institutions. Since the 1990s, democratizing the manner in which African 
leaders manage their countries has become top priority for Western donors as well as 
government elites. Democratization was supposed to enhance the effectiveness of the 
economic management tools that, in turn, would improve Africa’s economic potential. To 
cope with the new demands, most African leaders manipulated democracy in ways 
intended to ensure continuity of the status quo while claiming to be democratic at the 
same time. For most African regimes, democracy simply meant holding elections.84 As 
long as elections are held, it does not matter if state institutions remain incompetent and 
illegitimate. The question then becomes, does democracy really have an effect on 
growth?  
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that democracy guarantees economic 
progress. In some countries, democratization may even invite economic regression, at 
least in the short-term due to the uncertainty of results. One thing is evident however; 
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most countries that are prosperous today also claim to be democratic. Notwithstanding 
China and Malaysia, democracy is the system to which most countries aspire. If 
democracy cannot guarantee economic success, the most it can do is strengthen the 
economic management tools since democracy is, after all, a great exercise of institutions 
and policies. As Adam Przeworski states “democracy is a system of processing conflicts 
in which outcomes depend on what participants do but no single force controls what 
occurs.”85 Such exercise of institutions through democratic norms can make a difference. 
If institutions are strengthened and legitimized through the democratic process, it can 
facilitate increased reach in the informal sector, which can in turn help bridge the gap in 
the bifurcated state of economy and institutions.  
Regionalization of institutions is yet another possible option to institutional 
development. The idea of integration to increase economy of scale was proposed by some 
African leaders even before the various colonies asserted their independence from 
colonial rules. Internally, such leaders as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s 
Ahmed Sékou Touré lobbied hard for the realignment of the colonial construct. 
Externally, however, it was not the wish of the colonial powers, particularly France, to 
see such drastic rearrangement of the fixed borders and structures that colonial powers 
have imposed on the continent.86 The intent of the colonial powers was for these new 
countries to only be independent politically - not economically. As a result, the situation 
prevented the economies of the region from “achieving the critical mass needed to 
provide a production and consumer market large enough to thrive and compete 
internationally,” said Moss.87  
Politically or otherwise, the region is easily 25 or so states too many; therefore, 
regionalization of institutions may hold the key to the region’s economic growth 
prospects. The efforts to reach such an end are now left to the sub-regional organizations 
like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of 
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Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Currently, politics dominates the integration objectives of the member states. 
Grand claims are made, but methods and capabilities to achieve the claims are lacking. If 
there is a test for the future prospects of these regional economic organizations, one can 
point to the two CFA Franc monetary unions that have been in effect since 1945, yet 
produced little economic development for member states except maybe for the French 
Republic, the architect of the CFA initiates. Nevertheless, regionalization of economies is 
a step in the right direction because most of these economies are simply too small to 
compete in world markets on their own. “Out of the forty-eight sub-Saharan countries, 
twenty have less than 5 million people, or about the population of metropolitan Detroit,” 
says Moss.88 As of 2007, Moss highlighted that “the GDP of at least thirty sub-Saharan 
economies is $5 billion or less, or about equivalent to the capitalization of a midsize U.S. 
company.”89 As he explains: 
Africa, with a total economy roughly the same size as metropolitan 
Chicago, is split up into four dozen individual states. (Imagine the impact 
on life in Chicago if it was divided into forty districts each with border 
security, customs, and other hassles.) … Many states also mean many 
governments. This is highly inefficient, because each government needs to 
re-create similar structures and institutions—armies, health ministries, 
central banks, parliaments—each with their own overhead costs and 
staff.90 
While challenges remain, regional integration of economic institutions is the way 
to go. However, such initiatives will not be complete if national economies stay divided. 
Otherwise, the national economic bifurcation problems will simply transfer to regional 
problems.  
 





B. POLICY EXPLANATION 
Analysts who believe in the policy theory of Africa’s lack of economic growth 
often start by painting a rosy picture of Africa’s economic prospects immediately after 
independence. According to on various analysists, Africa’s economic future seemed 
bright beginning with the decolonization era in the 1960s.91 However, it was clear by the 
late 1970s that Africa’s economic prospects were on a downward trend. Most economic 
scholar generally place the blame squarely on African rulers, with Western experts, 
governments, and institutions like the Western-dominated IMF and the World Bank 
running to the rescue once the problems became intolerable. This segment reviews the 
short history of the policy effects on SSA’s economic stagnation. It details three policy 
considerations (trade, debt, and natural resource) in which African policy makers might 
have had some influence, but examination reveals these possibilities to not be self-
evidence.  
The history of economic policy in Africa is short because the largely stateless, 
agrarian and unlettered societies in SSA did not formulate economic policies in its 
modern form prior to the mid-1900s when these colonies became politically independent. 
The story of Africans economic policy can be summarized in that Africans adopted 
foreign economic policies at independence. It was clear by the 1980s that these policies 
were cumbersome. Western governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
stepped in and demanded policy structural readjustment for countries that wish to 
continue receiving foreign assistance. It has been 25 years of readjustments without 
major impact. Neither pre nor post policy adjustment addresses the bifurcation of the 
modern and traditional economies. 
The general consensus is that the policy choices of African leaders after 
independence set African countries on a course to economic stagnation. However, it is 
uncertain if there could have been a particular policy orientation that would have opened 
a different economic path for the region. Given the inter-dependence of economies of the 
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newly independent states with that of the former colonial powers, colonial influence on 
economic policy choices of these new states was something that the new leaders could 
not escape. Some African leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzania’s Julius 
Nyerere, and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré desperately searched for ways to design their 
own economic path. To keep things simple, other first generation African leaders like 
Cote D’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny or the DRC’s Joseph Mobutu chose to be toe-
the-line and follow orders from the same powers from which they just claimed 
independence. But regardless of the policy orientations of the newly independent African 
countries, nearly all African economies ended up in the same stagnating state beginning 
in the early 1980s. Regardless of the policy approaches that African leaders embraced, 
Western and non-Western economic advisors were present from the start to help the new 
leaders embark on these reckless policy endeavors. The idea at the time was that such 
massive national economic development could only be undertaken by the state.92 As 
Ayittey explains:  
In Francophone Africa, industries were nationalized, tariff barriers 
erected, and the state assumed near-total control of the national economy 
(Africa Analysis, October 2000, p.4) Rather interestingly, the World Bank, 
USAID, the U.S. State Department and even the development experts 
from Harvard University supported these arguments and accordingly 
channeled much aid resources to African governments (Bandow, 1986).93 
These were the years of the Marshall Plan after the devastations of WWII, and 
state-driven reconstruction of economies was the norm around the world—especially in 
Europe. For Africa, however, it was not reconstruction of economies that was in the 
works; it was creation of brand new economies where none previously existed. The 
difference between Europe’s post-war reconstruction and Africa’s economic construction 
is that modern economy in Europe has an established history. There were no shortage of 
experienced economic experts, business people, and an educated workforce that can 
quickly get Europe’s economic engines spinning given the right capital and material 
resources.  
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Even the typical Asian economies like Taiwan, S. Korea, and Hong Kong, with 
which Western analysts often compare African countries, had advantages that Africa did 
not possess. Unlike Africa, most societies in Asia were not stateless. Reading and writing 
was the norm in most of Asia. As Amartya Sen states, “At the time of Meiji restoration in 
1868, Japan had a higher rate of literacy than Europe.”94 It is no coincident that the 
official language of most, if not all Africa countries is the language of their former 
colonial masters. These are languages that the majority of Africans barely speak or 
understand, yet it is through these languages that Africans have to connect with the rest of 
the world. Even connection among and between Africans are now coordinated through 
the colonial set-up.  
Another advantage of these typical Asian example countries is that they are 
mostly island nations situated along a heavily travelled, maritime economic 
superhighway that carries the greatest percentage of commerce from Asia to the rest of 
the world. Dutch traders used Taiwan as a commercial base to engage China and other 
prominent markets in the area since the early 1600s, and this tradition of commerce 
continued on the island after in the modern era. Other advantages include the fact that 
these island nations were fertile grounds for foreign technological investments during the 
time that most of Africa was marred in proxy wars between East and West. As Sachs 
explains:  
Many poor East Asian countries were initially successful in raising 
technology not so much through home-grown innovation as through … as 
early as the late 1960s, Texas Instrument, National Semi-conductor, and 
Hewlett Packard, among others, set up operations in Singapore, Penang 
Island (Malaysia), and other parts of East Asia. They [the companies] 
saved a lot of money but also introduced what were otherwise very poor 
economies to sophisticated scientific technology and advanced 
management processes. If a poor country can become an attractive place 
for high-technology enterprises to conduct part of their production 
activities, then they can become a home, even at a low level of 
development, to quite sophisticated production and management 
techniques. Under the right circumstances, hosting such activities on the 
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home turf can then lead to a diffusion of knowledge, and participation in 
modern production, so that those benefits can then be transferred to 
domestic firms.95 
No such advantages were possible or occurred in Africa. As common economic 
principle states, economic activities that are labor-intensive will concentrate in places 
with high population, while capital-intensive endeavors rest with countries with low 
population. Africa, in general remains an underpopulated continent when compared to 
Europe or Asia, but capital resources are few and far in between.  
It is evident that the few educated African leaders that emerged to replace colonial 
administrators made a number of faux-pas in the initial years of establishing of national 
economic policies. It is, however, hypocritical to believe that these leaders had the 
capacity and experience to transform African societies into modernity in a relatively short 
period of time when the colonialists themselves could not do the same, even if they had 
tried. As Ayittey states: 
To initiate development, African nationalist leaders had to work with a 
cadre of inexperienced bureaucrats. Few of the leaders had any experience 
running the ship of state. Most had spent time in jail for agitating for 
freedom, or in the bush, fighting for independence for their perspective 
countries. Under that circumstance, mistakes were bound to be made.96 
These were mistakes from which these countries have never managed to recover 
despite the applications of various national and international remedies. It is also correct to 
say that out-going colonial administrators helped set the conditions for these missteps in 
efforts to damage the future viability of these weak and fragile states.97 With such a 
meager beginning, any society would have found it difficult to develop policies that 
would make a difference in this fast changing economic reality. While it is true that 
“some of these mistakes were too elementary to be excusable and could have been 
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avoided with a little more introspection and study,”98 what was expected of these leaders, 
not even the experienced predecessor could deliver. 
1. Trade Policy 
International trade, focusing mainly on the few traditional export commodities is 
probably the only area where Africans’ economic policies may have some influence since 
local economies do not matter much when it comes to policies. The saying goes that, 
“higher levels of trade also seem to correspond with higher rates of economic growth.”99 
This correlation is true in most cases, but when it comes to Africa, the export of the few 
land-based resources has not proven to stimulate growth. As Sachs explains, such 
agricultural commodities as sugar, cacao, coffee and tea were pathways to economic 
development in the 19th century.100 One can link this overreliance on the trading of key 
land-based resources beginning with rubber production in the Belgian Congo, coffee 
economy in Cote D’Ivoire under Houphouet Boigny, to today’s oil economy in such 
countries as Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea. Staying afloat a few export commodities 
is risky, as any market imbalance or unforeseen setback could bring economies 
crumbling down, especially when such trade is highly dependent on distant markets. In 
essence, the resource-based economies that have enriched colonial Africa and have more 
recently created fortunes for the well-connected political and economic elites do not form 
the basis of Africa’s long-term growth and prosperity. Sachs further explains: 
Highly developed economies shifted increasingly toward knowledge base, 
and as transport and communications costs fell markedly, the actual 
ownership of raw materials became less and less essential to economic 
development. Natural-resource-scarce economies in East Asia, such as 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan became wealthy by exporting technology-
intensive manufacturing goods and importing the primary commodities 
that were needed for their productions and for final consumption demand. 
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It has often been noted in recent years, in fact, those natural-resource-rich 
economies have fared particularly badly in the past half century.101  
Despite the shift to manufacturing, African leaders remain committed to raw-
material resource extraction. Whether in logging, oil, or minerals, the raw materials are 
normally extracted from their sources, put on a ship, and exported to foreign lands for 
further processing—an arrangement that only helps to create jobs outside of the 
continent.  
2. Debt Policy 
Debt control is another area where African policy makers should have some 
influence, but no policy can change the fact that most governments in the region have lost 
control of this debt trap to which they have been duped since independence. As Konadu-
Agyemang and Panford state, “the greatest threat to Africa’s development comes from 
the debt overhang.”102 Borrowed funds that were supposed to supplement resources to 
help stimulate economic growth never reached such effects in most African countries. At 
the turn of the last century, Africa’s debts stood at around $375 billion, noted Onyeani. 
He continues that “in 1998 Africa spent more money servicing the loan than they 
received in assistance.”103 This condition is like borrowing money to pay debt which 
further indebted the continent and future generations. With the possible exception of 
South Africa, there is no country that one can point as evidence to where $375billion was 
spent, explains Onyeani; it certainly did not go to infrastructure development, good roads, 
better energy (electricity), or better health care.104 Even if national economies were to 
evolve to a point of making active returns, the gains will be put aside to pay debts. 
Consequently, some choose to stay indebted even when oil revenues should have been 
enough to wipeout these debts. 
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3. Natural Resource Policy 
Natural resources policy is the other area in which African policy makers could 
have had some influence, but it is difficult to make policies concerning resources over 
which Africans have little control. The best example for such analysis can be taken from 
Africa’s oil resources that, in the last decade, constitute the economic lifeblood of many 
African countries. A case in point is Nigeria, which nearly doubled the size of its GDP to 
become SSA’s largest economy since rebasing its GDP in 2013 to include elements of the 
informal economy that had not previously played a role in GDP calculation.105 In 1990, 
“oil revenue accounted for about 93 percent of Nigerian export earnings, 75 percent of 
foreign exchange earnings, 87 percent of total government revenues, and 45 percent of 
the gross national product,” says Augustine Ikein.106 Today, these figures have not 
changed much. Onyeani uses the oil industry as an example for those who want to get a 
clearer picture of what economic freedom of production means for African leaders, for, 
despite the huge influence in its economy, the country has little control over its oil.  
To discover the oil, a Caucasian [foreigner] has to bring his equipment and 
survey our land and shores. If there is oil, he estimates the amount of oil 
located in that area. We award him the contract of drilling for the oil. He 
brings his own men. Unlike in his country, whatever environmental 
damage the drilling does is none of his concerns. All he wants is the oil ... 
he brings his tankers, loads the oil and brings it to his own country where 
he refines it. He pays less than $12 per barrel for the crude oil. He refines 
the crude into several different products, which are then sent back to us at 
more than $65 per barrel. In the 1998 year, Exxon generated revenues of 
$100 billion, Mobil $47 billion, Texaco, $32 billion and Chevron $27 
billion. The revenue of these four companies almost outstripped the 
revenues of all the 50 Black African countries south of the Sahara 
combined.107  
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When one talks about African economies, it is important to specify exactly which 
economy is being discussed because if the example is the preceding segment holds true, 
there is no such thing as a modern African economy. The formal economy is mostly an 
affair between foreign firms and a corrupt selection of political elites. The traditional 
economy which has sustained SSA for generations may be the only true African 
economy. There is definitely something wrong when the most valuable resources of 
African nations are controlled by extra-national corporations and there is little that 
Africans can do about it. No one is denouncing outsourcing, but in the case of the oil 
business in Africa, these countries are not outsourcing such activities by choices, they 
simply do not have the human and financial capital required to do it themselves. There is 
nothing that policies can do to change this fact. 
C. INSTITUTION, POLICY, AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
Dual-economy, multiple institutional orientations, and misguided policies 
designed to influence only a portion of an economy are simply bad combinations for 
economic growth. Policy and institutions do not create economies; they are economic 
enabling tools. It is after people began to transact can these tools assist in making human 
transactions more efficient. Leaders of African countries only experimented with the 
modern economy when their countries became independent in the mid-1900s. Whether 
through adaptation of the socialist or the capitalist approach, these attempts at 
establishing modern economies have generally failed. They failed because the novices 
misunderstood modern economy. Just as a dollar’s worth is about the intangible value 
and confidence people assign to what it represents, an economy is about people’s choices, 
confidence, risk and trust exercised in economic activities.  
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1. Institutions and the Dual-Economy 
Douglas North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic, and social interaction.”108 Institutions are supposed to 
“evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; history in 
consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical 
performance of economies can only be understood as part of a sequential story.”109 It is 
how it was done in most of Europe. Europeans developed on the back of a mostly 
agrarian society and, through population growth, urbanization, wars, homegrown and 
borrowed technology, they evolved into the knowledge-based economy.  
The development of institutions in Africa took a different turn. Indigenous 
African institutions were violently assaulted through colonial encroachment. Coexistence 
between the Western and the indigenous institutions have been problematic from the 
start. Both institutions operate in their own space, within their own reach and limits in 
Africa’s dual-economic system.  
Western institutions can help the formal economies if those who depend on these 
institutions choose to exercise them the way they were intended to work. But this has not 
been the case in most of Africa. More often than not, managers and clients of these 
institutions do not play by their own rules. It is this dilemma that often keeps potential 
investors away. Whether the countries institutionally adjust or maintain the status-quo, 
these institutions will remain alien to most Africans as long as they are managed by 
people who do not represent the interest of those in the indigenous sector.  
On the other hand the indigenous institutions do not have a track record of helping 
to grow economies either. This informality of institutions is suitable for societies that are 
generally small, dispersed, and agrarian. As reviewed earlier, economic growth has 
shown to go hand-and-hand with urbanization. Accordingly, the management of complex 
urban societies cannot rely on such institutions of affection, relations, or lineage. 
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Complex and highly urban societies as well as their rural counterparts require institutions 
in which the norms are clearly spelled out, preferably on paper, for local as well as 
visitors.  
2. Policy and the Dual-Economy 
The source of the policy problems was the belief that governments and policies 
can create economies. So bad were the policies adapted by African leaders that only 20 
years after independence, most African leadership has lost their autonomy in making 
national economic policies. The de facto policy makers in most African countries are now 
the IMF and the World Bank for two reasons: The first is that the Fund and the Bank has 
their loan money on the line. The second is that these IFIs had a hand in creating the 
problems; therefore, they must be part of the solution. But these policies adjustment or 
readjustment can only address the formal economy, the one that these institutions have 
arranged with African elites decades before. As Barrat Brown explains it: 
The answer to all Africa’s problems is, they say, to open up national 
markets to world competition and free trade. While the IMF and the World 
Bank have persuaded more than thirty African governments to follow their 
advice, the results has been even worse economic decline in these 
countries than in those which did not adopt the Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes.110 
Even if these adjustments were to work, the question is how far these remedies 
can take African economies before realizing that the informal economy has to be part of 
the solution. As previously alluded, the traditional economy does not need written 
policies. This sector has been conducting business long enough for the policies to be 
understood by all members. Unless African governments can manage to bring this sector 
under the control of the modern economy, national policy rearrangements will continue 
to mean little to the traditional sector and overall growth. 
                                                 
110 Barrat Brown, Africa’s Choices, 14. 
 47 
IV. HISTORY AND CULTURE EXPLANATION 
It must be noted that every society evolves into modernity in its own manner as 
the circumstances are different in each country or region. Because of its relative isolation, 
the sub-Saharan part of the African continent developed methods and manners that were 
distinctively African, while the peopling of the region was purely an internal process.111 
As various experts conclude, “the African way, while not communistic, is 
communitarian.”112 The sharing and trading of basic subsistence, especially at the 
household or small community level is the norm. This logic runs opposite to capitalism 
which emphasizes individualism, expansion of the means of production, and the transfer 
of wealth and power to the hands of a few while the rest is mostly reduced to wage 
laborers at the service of the few. African cultures appear to have generally resisted the 
capitalist logic. This proposed resistance forms the basis of the dual-economy that 
continues to linger in Africa. But if such resistance continues to exist, it cannot be that 
African cultures are against capitalist principle; it is the long history of bad experiences 
with imperialism, logically confused with capitalism that invites this guarded approach. 
This chapter examines Africans’ cultural and historical approach to economy in general. 
It considers whether it is African cultures or the disadvantageous history with outside 
forces that limit the regional economic growth. 
It is difficult to separate culture from history because historical experiences of a 
society normally shape its culture. Essentially however, culture can be modified, but 
history, if properly accounted for, must provide answers to a given phenomenon. If 
cultural norms are major factors of hindrance to economic growth in Africa, then the 
modern institutions and Western style policies that Africans are trying to cope with make 
little difference. For what it’s worth, culture matters, and it is an element that analysts 
must consider when evaluating the lack of economic progress in Africa.  
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A. CULTURE 
In her listing of some of the generally contemplated reasons for Africa’s poor 
economic showing, Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo highlighted that: 
There is … the largely unspoken and insidious view that the problem with 
Africa is Africans—that culturally, mentally and physically Africans are 
innately different. That somehow, deeply embedded in their psyche is an 
inability to embrace development and improve their own lot in life without 
foreign guidance and help.113  
This unspoken view of African cultural norms is reinforced by the reality that the 
majority of the entrepreneurs, wholesale and retail store owners and merchants across 
Africa are not indigenous Africans. To find native African ownership, one must go to the 
usually informal, street markets based mostly on the exchange of basic subsistence goods 
and low-end retails commodities. As Moss articulates, “some groups can be seen as 
dominating the economy, such as people of South Asian descent in East Africa, 
Europeans in southern Africa, and Lebanese in West Africa.”114 Is this reality a 
coincidence? 
A case in point is Liberia, a country whose first president was what would today 
be considered an African American who had his own shipping business in the mid-1800s 
when Liberia claimed its independence from the American Colonization Society.115 
Many of the free American Negros of the Liberian colonies had experience in ocean 
transport, but it was clear that by the mid-1900s that Liberia’s maritime import and 
export was entirely in the hands of Lebanese traders. One would think that the Americo-
Liberians tradition of business ownership would continue, but it was later revealed that 
the true power of business ownership in Liberia rested with the Lebanese. When the 
Lebanese followed other foreigners out of the country in the early 1980s due to civil 
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unrest, the country’s economy collapsed by 90 percent.116 It has become the general 
tendency that Africans generally cannot accomplish great things in this modern era 
without foreign assistance.  
Africans are no less intelligent than the Europeans, Indians, Chinese, or any other 
group of people who has recently adopted the modern principles of economy to increase 
prosperity. As previously mentioned, economic successes of each of these groups have a 
history of their own. It was not for lack of intelligence that Europeans used to persecute 
their Jewish forebears and early practitioners of the modern form of economy, especially 
the art of money lending and contracting of promissory notes with high interest rates. 
Europe’s Christian culture regarded such transactions as sinful in the medieval period. 
Jews were confined to special quarters—later known as ghettoes—along with their tavule 
and their banci for lending money with interest on return.117 Today, however, the banci 
that the Jews of Europe used to conduct sinful transactions became what we come to 
know as banks; and where would world economies be without banks to facilitate 
worldwide financial transactions?  
The ascent of money, as described by Niall Ferguson, developed into the bonds 
market that financed the many European wars in which governments borrowed from their 
populations with promise of higher future returns. The interesting thing about the 
evolution of money and market is that the concepts did not originate from Europe, but 
today, the modern economy is Eurocentric. Like many other things, Europeans imported 
it from the East and modified their cultures to adapt to it, and later used it to conquer the 
world. Africans in SSA did not have this historical background, nor did they have early 
contact with other cultures to import such developmental phenomenon.  
The Chinese figuratively put up a wall when they first encountered the refined 
modern economy introduced by European traders. Chinese believed that the system they 
had was good enough as the Chinese dynasties were largely self-sufficient. The Anglo-
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Chinese wars forced down the walls to open China to trade. It took some time for the 
Chinese to regain their balance and get onboard with this Eurocentric economic system. 
Already the world’s largest economy, China is now poised to beat Europe at its own 
game. How were the Chinese so successful at modifying their culture to adapt to a system 
that was not their own? They copied. They learned how their opponents operated, studied 
their models and technics, made cheaper, less efficient products if necessary, but they 
increased their human capital over time.  
The difference between China and Africa is that the Chinese had a unified system 
prior to European encroachment. There was one China, and Chinese civilizations 
permeated the Far East. Africans, on the others hand, had to learn that they are 
Africans—members of one entity in the eyes of non-Africans. Prior to the Arabs calling 
them Africans, people on the continent were just that, ‘people,’ colonizing a large mass 
of land with a few unified polities in some locations. It was this condition that made it 
easier for European culture to have so easily subjugated that of the Africans. Even 
“educated Africans have themselves been brainwashed by the Europeans education into 
devaluing their own culture,” says Brown.118 Since colonization, it is questionable if 
there still is such a thing as African culture when it comes to economy. 
None of the presumed cultural differences earlier mentioned carry much weight in 
the current state of world economy affairs. Since the end of the WWII, globalization of 
economic culture has become the new norm and this norm is based around supply and 
demand. Regardless of the cultural orientation of a particular society, such society will, in 
some shape or form, find itself demanding supplies and/or services from another 
community which will strive to service the demand. Africa is no exception in this 
integrated world of economies.  
Asia was once the target of cultural bias beginning as early as Weber’s analyses 
of various cultural orientations.119 As Amartya Sen surmise, “Max Weber was 
particularly clear that Confucianism was quite unsuited for a dynamic industrial 
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economy.”120 Decades later, such analysis proved less than correct. Africa will also 
survive and rise above current cultural bias, but the process cannot start until Africans 
stop allowing the rest of the world to define who they are. The process has to start with 
reducing Afro-pessimism within Africa and Africans. 
B. HISTORY 
It takes time and directed measures to transform a culturally diverse, stateless and 
agrarian society from antiquity to modernity. The transformation is even more 
complicated when the economic system that this society knows and practices for 
generations is circumvented, forcing the society to accept a foreign system that it barely 
understands. This segment reviews Africans’ economic history in its relationship with 
outside forces. It argues that from the first major economic encounter to the present, not 
much has changed in Africans’ economic interactions with foreign interests. 
Consequently, centuries of cooperation with outside forces have brought little in terms of 
economic growth for Africans.  
Unlike the Europeans, Africans did not have the opportunist predisposition to 
venture in mass out of the continent to search for economic opportunities in other places. 
As a result, others brought new economic know-how to Africa, and outsiders often 
determined the worth of Africa’s most valuable economic resources.121 Early Africans 
moved about the continent surviving on agriculture, “adapting to the environment rather 
than transforming it, in order to avert extinction by crop-failure,” says historian John 
Illife.122 Africans were still trying to colonize a huge continent as the Europeans were 
exploring and colonizing other places for economic gains, increasing their experience and 
knowledge of the world in the process.  
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The Portuguese are recorded as having first patrolled the Western African coast in 
the late 15th century to trade various items in return for gold.123 The Arabs controlled 
trade and spread their culture along the eastern coast down the Horn of Africa to present-
day Tanzania. In the north, Arab nomads broke through the Sahara desert, mostly on the 
wings of Islam to trade and spread their religion. So while the north, because of its 
proximity to Eurasia, had some contact with other cultures, the southern part of the 
continent remained partly hidden to the rest of the world. As Iliffe rightly argues, partial 
isolation made Africans more receptive to external influence, including their willingness 
to export slaves.124 Consequently, SSA’s first major entry into global economy occurred 
through the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Africans were the commodity.  
While the first major encounter brought Africans into realm of global economy, 
Moss argues that the extraction of an estimated 11 million from an already 
underpopulated continent was probably the most devastating historical encounter for 
Africa and Africans. As he explains: “prior to the nineteenth century, slavery was 
commonplace in much of the world and many in African societies accepted it as a feudal-
style labor arrangement.”125 Slaves in the labor arrangement generally knew what to 
expect from such arrangement. What changed is that the trans-Atlantic slavery business 
took the old feudal-style practice to a whole new dimension. African contribution was to 
use the provided weapons to capture human-beings and turn them over to foreign traders. 
As far as the Africans understood the trade, it continued the age-old feudal-style labor 
arrangement. But the true reality of the inter-continental slave business was only known 
to the victims and the non-Africans who controlled the life cycle of the human 
commodities. In essence, the continent’s economic destiny is still influenced in some 
measures by ancestors of the same people who helped Africans set on the disastrous 
course of selling millions into slavery from a continent that was already underpopulated. 
Whether in careless extraction of people as in yesteryear or the extraction of natural 
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resources since the colonial era, the arrangement between African elites and foreign 
interest continues unabated. 
Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson give an example of how the Congo 
kingdom rejected much of the technology introduced by Portuguese traders during their 
first encounters in the late 1400s. For economic incentive, however, the Africans in that 
part of the continent were quick to adopt one innovation—the gun. “They used the new 
and powerful tool to respond to market incentives,” says Acemuglu, “to capture and 
export slaves.”126 The authors continue that “the real reason that the Congolese did not 
adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so,” but mostly 
for the fear that their excess production from using imported tools, would be confiscated 
by the kingdom.127 Not even the king was interested in applying more productive 
methods, argues Acemoglu and Robinson, “exporting slave was much more 
profitable.”128 This example is similar to Western critics who blame ineffective economic 
policies on the inexperienced, and often times greedy African leaders, even though their 
Western advisors were present and greatly contributed to helping these leaders make 
these bad decisions. 
What most Western experts fail to understand is that “technology has to be 
cleared through cultural customs … and African culture is not European culture and 
cannot simply be transplanted,” says Michael B. Brown.129 To this day, outsiders are 
trying to get Africans to adapt foreign methods and are mystified as to why Africans are 
simply not adapting. Similarly, just about every economic expert is looking for the one 
economic model that Africa can adopt to get the sub-region on some kind of economic 
ladder to success. So far, none of the models seems to be a good universal fit for Africa. 
As Moss puts it, “economists simply cannot say what exactly causes growth and thus are 
unable to come up with clear remedies to generate faster growth. There are lots of ideas 
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and many hints, but no unambiguous answers that apply universally.”130 Essentially, 
what works for one place may not work for another.  
Evidently, African authorities are still making decisions that have adverse effects 
on their societies and many of these decisions continue to be encouraged by outsiders. 
One can draw a parallel with Acemoglu’s example with the current economic situation in 
Africa today. Based on the above example, the Congo king knew what he was doing 
within the limits of his knowledge of the world around him. The Portuguese traders, 
however, had a clear vision of the possible outcome of the activities in which they were 
engaged. The guns were not made in the Congo in 1493, and they are still not made in the 
Congo today. Greed and the lust for profit blinded any sense of moral conscience when it 
came to taking advantage of a people who were not exposed to thing beyond their 
immediate environment due to lack of contact with others. The lack of human capital, 
experience, and know-how is still a huge problem in Africa. The guns that were provided 
were explicitly used by those to whom they were provided for the purpose of furthering a 
business arrangement between outsiders and a small cadre of African governing elites 
selected and legitimized by non-Africans. Today, these types of business arrangements 
continue, especially in the extractive industries that comprise the modern sector of 
economies in Africa.  
C. CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
The vast majority of Africans have made the rational choices not to abandon their 
indigenous system in exchange for one with which they have had a traumatized history. If 
Africa cannot evolve under its own terms, it is senseless to do so under a system in which 
non-Africans will dictate how much Africans can economically achieve. Since the 
region’s political independence, the more economically advanced countries have been 
trying to convince poor African countries that “poverty is your fault,” says Sachs, “be 
like us (or what we imagine ourselves to be—free market orientated, entrepreneurial, 
fiscally responsible) and you too, can enjoy the riches of private-sector-led economic 
                                                 
130 Moss, African Development, 7. 
 55 
development.”131 While the offer looks attractive, Africans can generally see the hidden 
costs of such a venture. 
It is true that capitalism has proven to be the system that most encourages 
economic growth. In Africa, however, the capitalist system and culture has either yet to 
take hold or the African system and cultures are simply rejecting it. The RSA may be the 
only SSA country where the capitalist culture has reached a large share of the national 
population, but by the same token, the country’s economy is often described by some as 
more European instead of African. A few other SSA countries, such as Botswana, Kenya, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia have also made some small progress toward 
capitalism, but they are far from being labeled capitalistic economies.  
If Africans are not easily welcoming the invisible hand and the laissez-faire 
attitude of capitalist system, one should look to history instead of culture as the primary 
reason. As Ayittey notes Kenya’s economic status just before independence: 
In 1955 in Kenya, among registered companies, there were about 246 new 
companies owned by Europeans with a nominal capital of £8.9 million (£ 
= $1.83), 99 companies belonging to Asians with a nominal capital of £3.6 
million, and only one company belonging to an African with a nominal 
capital of £250.132 
These are the conditions under which the world, particularly the Western world, 
wanted Africans to partake in the global capitalist system. The only Africans that the 
imperialists can partially convince to validate such laissez-faire arrangements are the tiny 
elites with whom they have been cooperating since the first major economic encounter. 
The vast majority of Africans who have not been part of any deal will continue with what 
they have been doing for generations unless they can clearly see the benefits that 
changing their indigenous practices will bring.  
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D. CULTURE AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
It would seem as if there are two divergent cultural approaches to economic 
developments in the SSA region: the capitalist culture in the modern sector and the 
indigenous African culture in the traditional economy. It is irrational, however, to call 
what is being witnessed in the Westernized sector of African economies capitalism. The 
three main activities that comprise the modern African economy are extraction of natural 
resources, service, and retail—the purchase of manufactured products from elsewhere 
and reselling them on the African markets. An economy that does not manufacture is far 
from being capitalistic.  
Culture matters, but there is little evidence to suggest that African cultures are 
averse to economic growth. Culture did not create the indigenous economy in Africa. 
This economy developed out of traditional patterns that are universal. Even the 
communitarian culture, the norm that some prominent analysts love to associate with 
Africanism, is not something distinctly African. It is a universal tendency for largely 
agrarian societies to be communitarian. Not long ago, many of the same cultural 
propositions that are now being made about Africa cultures were directed toward Asia. 
As Severeno puts it: 
Fifty years ago, great intellectuals explained to us, with weighty 
arguments, why Asia was condemned to famine and underdevelopment; 
how Asian culture and institutions, imprinted by Confucianism, formed 
unsurpassable obstacles to the region’s development. Thirty years later, 
their intellectual heirs explained how the Confucian ethic was crucial to 
the economic take-off of East Asia and its entry into modernity. Will we 
let ourselves be gulled again by the sirens of culturalism?133 
If there is one culture that can bridge the modern and the indigenous economy, 
that culture is employment. As the common biblical saying goes, “man does not live by 
bread alone.” Claude Ake highlighted that a more fundamental truth is that “man cannot 
live without bread.”134 To obtain his daily bread, man must work. When a person has 
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quality employment that provides for him and his family, culture becomes less of an issue 
in this modern era of economy. Essentially, it is not African culture that keeps the larger 
part of the African populace in the subsistence-based traditional economies; they simply 
don’t have many other options. Create quality employment and the seeming cultural 
differences between people in the dual-economy disappear. It is the condition that once 
rendered the RSA the exception in African economies; the tiny European element in the 
RSA used their relative advantage to establish manufacturing early in the country’s 
economic evolution by turning the majority black mass into wage laborers. The 
establishment of manufacturing is what some African leaders attempted to do when they 
insisted on creating local industries to compete with those of the metropoles. Unable to 
compete in this fast changing, manufacturing-lead global economic environment, 
Africans retreated to what they know best—the informal way of economy—leaving the 
extractive, service, and intercontinental trade to governments and their foreign partners. 
E. HISTORY AND THE DUAL-ECONOMY 
Africa’s history of contact with the outside world created the dual-economy. It 
was the inability of Africans to shape the course of their economic destiny that resulted in 
contemporary outcomes. Africans’ lack of exposure and experience with globally tested 
methods put them at a disadvantage from the start. What’s done is done. The question 
now is what Africans will do to change their course and create their own path. Given 
observed trends, there is not much that they can do because most African governments, 
which have been the primary drivers of change, continue to depend on foreign creditors 
for hand-outs and economic solutions.  
Since the failures of economic take-off during the first two decades of 
independence, the IFIs have demanded readjustments focusing mainly on controlling 
poor and excessive government intervention, spending, and state ownership. As Sachs 
explains it: “belt tightening, privatization, liberalization, and good governance became 
the order of the day.”135 While these efforts put lots of strain on most African 
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governments in the short-term, most African leadership had no choice but to accept their 
creditors’ demands.  
Africans leaders have essentially lost their autonomy in the formal sectors of 
economies. The IFIs have become the de facto policy makers in most African countries. 
The IMF for example ordered Zimbabwe to sell its national grains reserves in order to 
pay debts. With no reserves, low agricultural output in subsequent years forced the 
country to import grains at higher prices.136 Because of debts owed and the continuous 
need for future loans, African leaders are now busy implementing policies and demands 
of international institutions while ignoring what can benefit local economies.  
Note that the rearrangements focus mainly on fixing deficiency in governments, 
the same governments that have had little to no control over indigenous economies. 
Therefore, even if these adjustments worked, the new arrangements will continue to mean 
little to the indigenous economy. But since it was the arrangements between political 
elites and foreign entities that created the problems of the dual economy, the solutions to 
the region’s economic growth may indeed lie in the proper management of Africa’s 
relations with the rest of the world. The first step would be for Africans to regain control 
of their economic affairs. If Africans can manage to get a grip of their economic affairs, 
past loan can be considered paid because there is no loan amount in the current debt trap 
that can equate the amount of wealth these same creditors have commandeered or stolen 
out of Africa.  
African economies will grow. The question is how and who will control it. 
Foreign elements want the control but not the responsibilities. They have historically 
been pre-disposed to pull out their money at the first sign of problems. The indigenous 
sector is determined not to partake in any transformation that does not cater to its needs. 
Until such time there is a formal understanding, the phenomenon of the dual-economy 
and stagnant growth will likely continue. 
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V. RECENT REGIONAL GROWTH 
Africa is still economically challenged but many economic analysts believe that a 
reversal from two decades of economic stagnation since the early 1980s is in progress at 
the turn of the 21st century. This chapter will review the main factors (commodity price, 
urbanization, service) that are believed to be the driving force behind the recent growth 
trends in the region. If this growth is indeed authentic, it should at least partially address 
some of the economic growth challenges identified in previous chapters.  
The overwhelming outpouring of positive economic indicators in the last 10 years 
definitely gives the sense that SSA economies are collectively on the verge of a 
breakthrough. As late as 2001, economic headlines, books, and expert analysis of African 
economies were almost entirely negative. However, “gone are the traditional pessimism 
about the continent’s growth prospects and the reference to basket case economies,”137 
says economist and social science professor Dani Rodrik. Today’s headlines on African 
economies are mostly positive with such titles as: “Africa: open for business,”138 “Africa 
Rising: A hopeful continent,”139 and “An African Growth Miracle?”140 With these highly 
positive signals, one cannot help but to take a closer look at the meaning of it all.  
Since 2000, various sources report real GDP in SSA to average between 4–6 
percent (see Figure 3). It took a plunge in 2009, a reaction to the global economic 
slowdown of 2008, and quickly rebounded to the aforementioned average and stayed 
positive since.141 Even the 2009 dip was largely the result of adding numbers from South 
Africa, the largest African economy and the most integrated with advanced global 
markets at that time. The rest of Africa fared rather well in 2009 when compared to world 
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output.142 The World Bank 2015 market resiliency report concludes that “growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa is fairly resilient to a variety of external shocks. In contrast, it is highly 
vulnerable to domestic shocks, such as drought or civil conflict,”143 says the same report. 
But this resiliency could be good or bad. It could indicate that, apart from South Africa, 
the rest of the continent is not integrated enough to the world markets, or maybe Africa 
needs to pay more attention to internal factors if this recent growth and accompanying 
market resiliency are to stay the course. Either way, the latest growth trends are validated 
by various sources, but analysts are still taking a cautious view at drawing conclusions. 
Figure 3.  GDP Growth (%), 1980–2019 (Projected) 
 
Source: Amadou Sy, “Is Africa at a Historical Crosswords to Convergence?” Brookings 
Institute, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/11/think-
tank-20.  
A. COMMODITY PRICE INCREASE 
The aforementioned Economist article entitled, “Africa open for business” 
captures the most details of the recent growth phenomenon in one document. According 
to the same article, one of the driving forces behind the recent growth and rebound since 
2000 is “surging external demand [for African commodities—mainly oil & minerals gas], 
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especially from China and India.”144 But research has shown that apart from a few 
exceptions, such resource-based economies have historically not propelled countries to 
economic prosperity. As Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner explain, “One of the 
surprising features of modern economic growth is that economies abundant in natural 
resources have tended to grow slower than economies without substantial natural 
resources.”145 This observation goes to the core of the common logic called the resource 
curse.  
A country like Equatorial Guinea has held one of the strongest GDP average for 
decades because of its oil export, yet, the country’s general economic posture is a bad as 
any other poor African country. Because of its relative low population, Equatorial 
Guinea’s average income is slightly higher than most African countries, but the 
calculations do not take into account the huge gap between in income levels. Rather, the 
country’s GDP and other analyses are overly concerned with the few primary export 
commodities, while economic activities in the traditional sector are usually not a factor.  
Countries like Angola and Nigeria will continue to lead the pack with such 
resource-based growth as more African countries are inviting experts to search for their 
own petroleum sources. Uganda was advertised to be the next oil giant due to a recent 
discovery, but as evident with the latest price-drop at the gas pumps, not even a cash-crop 
product like oil is immune from market shocks, and investors in the Uganda oil 
exploration endeavor have been put on alert. Economic Professor Robert Looney 
properly expresses that “in Uganda, it’s the Bust before the Boom” as the country’s 
leaders accumulate large amount of debts with the hope of repayment through future oil 
revenue that may not come to fruition.146 Generally, such a scenario has been the 
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tendency of Africans governments since independence, yet, they always seem to find 
lenders to extend loans that these governments are almost always unable to repay.  
B. URBANIZATION 
The growing urbanization and ‘consumerization’ in Africa is the second proposed 
driving force behind the recent growth. Maybe there is something behind this latest 
economic trend after all, since, as various other economic experts similarly note: 
“Modern economic growth is accompanied first and foremost by urbanization, that is, by 
a rising share of a nation’s population living in urban areas.”147 One reasons for the 
urbanization argument is that “As Africans flock to the cities and disposable income 
rises, their demand for modern goods and services will accelerate, and global businesses 
… will strive to meet this demand.”148 With these projections, one cannot help but 
wonder if this recent growth phenomenon is truly about Africa’s long-term development 
and prosperity. The projections appear to cater to those who want to come to Africa to 
succeed at the expense of African consumerist tendencies. As previously stated, Africans 
consume everything but produce little to nothing for sale on the global market.  
Not long ago, urbanization was a thing to discourage due to all the misfortunes 
overcrowding could bring; now increased urbanization is described as a potential 
economic blessing for global entrepreneurs. One has to look no further than South Africa 
for examples of the deprived shanty slums consisting of large numbers of crude dwellings 
that the urban manufacturing and processing plants invited. The initial idea in the RSA 
was for contracted rural labors to come to the urban centers with a round-trip ticket to 
return home once work contract ended. But that is not what resulted. In fact, it was this 
urbanization that put pressure to force the end of the apartheid system. As the 
urbanization of African countries continues, African can learn a lot from the South 
African example.  
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It is not the intent of this analysis to downplay the importance of foreign 
investment, urbanization, and the supply of modern goods to the demand of the growing 
African urbanite. After all, foreign investment, particularly in manufacturing, can help 
bridge the gap between the formal and the informal sectors of economies if such 
investments create jobs. However, the supply and demand should be a two-way street in 
which African demands for modern goods are supplied by global businesses, while 
Africans produce product to exchange in return. It cannot be a situation in which non-
Africans market produce and Africans do all the consuming. Such an arrangement is 
unlikely to bring long-tern economic growth.  
C. THE SERVICE SECTORS 
The service sector is said to be the third element that is feeding the recent growth 
trend in Africa. Communication services, particularly with cellular phone industry, are 
leading the charge with the service of the trend. Even those who are barely able to 
economically sustain themselves possess one or more cellular phones nowadays. It is not 
to say that there is anything wrong with a service economy; highly developed countries 
and regions are all about service. The difference is that the service-based growth in 
Africa is highly skewed toward the few categories - mainly banking and tele-
communication. The continent has almost entirely bypassed structural development like 
installation of landline telephones, and leapfrogged straight into the next generation of 
communication.  
If opportunities for shortcuts exist, bypassing stages seems warranted, but such 
actions demand proper management as the actors may find themselves stuck in transition 
when there is not a structure to which to return if developments get out of hand. There is 
little evidence to suggest that any of the aforementioned drivers of the recent growth are 
planned occurrences. As Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang and Kwamina Panford noted, 
“even though people all over the continent crave for mobile phones, radios, computers 
and other contraptions of information technology, few African countries have laid the 
foundations for rationalized and clearly formulated policies to guide their participation in 
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the ICT revolution.”149 The commodity phenomenon is cyclical. African has been 
through such cycles before. Urbanization is not new but it has proportionally increased 
when compared to previous periods. The question that must be asked is: does any or all 
of the drivers of the recent growth herald a new dawn of foreign domination or will 
Africans take the lead in directing African economies to a programmed destination? 
Since the formal sector of African economies provides the base for the recent 
development, what will be the implications of participation on non-involvement of the 
indigenous sector?  
D. EXPERTS’ ANALYSIS AND FUTURE OF RECENT GROWTH 
While Rodrick is just as enthusiastic as the next economist about the region’s 
latest growth prospects, his balance sheet after reviewing the data suggests caution: 
Much of the recent performance seems to be due to temporary boost: an 
advantageous external context and making up of lost ground after a long 
period of economic decline. While the region’s fundamentals have 
improved, the payoffs to macroeconomic stability and improved 
governance are mainly to foster resilience and lay the groundwork for 
growth, rather than to ignite and sustain rapid productivity growth. The 
traditional engines behind rapid growth and convergence, structural 
change and industrialization, are operating at less than full power.150 
SSA is indeed unique in historical experience, culture, and environmental setting. It is 
unlikely that the region will experience an economic transformation the likes of 18th 
century England. Asia, the region with the latest economic growth miracles followed a 
manufacturing approach, which is related to industry. If African countries maintain the 
latest growth trends, “they will do so pursuing a growth model that is different from 
earlier miracles based on industrialization,” says Rodrick, continuing, “Perhaps it will be 
agriculture led growth. Perhaps it will be services. But it will look quite different than 
what we have seen before.”151 Maybe there are things that the world can learn from the 
African experience after all. 
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While the experts try to figure out the significance of the growth trends, 
Shantayanan Devarajan, Chief Economist at the World Bank’s African Region, and 
Wolfgang Fengler, the Bank’s lead economist for most of East Africa have concluded 
that “the optimists’ view of Africa’s future is ultimately closer to the mark.”152 Like most 
loyal World Bank executive would conclude, structural and political adjustments are 
major contributors to the sustainability of the growth trend. But Shantayanan and 
Fengler’s essay also concedes that “Despite Africa’s recent growth, there are few signs of 
what economists refer to as structural transformation: the shift from low-productivity 
agriculture to higher-productivity manufacturing and services.”153 The approach is to 
wait for it, argue the aforementioned Economist editorial, “A Hopeful Continent.” 
The biggest reason to be hopeful is that it takes time for results from past 
investment to come through, and many such benefits have yet to 
materialise. Billions have already been put into roads and schools over the 
past decade; the tech revolution has only just reached the more remote 
corners of the continent; plenty of new oilfields and gold mines have been 
tapped but are not yet producing revenues. The aid pipeline too is fairly 
full. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation alone has invested $1.7 
billion in Africa since 2006 but acknowledges that “it takes years and 
years to shift the system.” Some aid will be wasted, some new roads will 
remain empty and more than a few barrels of oil will be stolen. Yet 
whereas currently not even half of Africa’s countries are what the World 
Bank calls “middle income” (defined as at least $1,000 per person a year), 
by 2025 the bank expects most African countries to have reached that 
stage.154 
What the future holds for this recent growth is unknown. Unlike Asia, there are 
few African example economies that SSA countries can emulate. Some normally point to 
Botswana and Mauritius as Africa’s example economies. Mauritius is a small island 
whose history barely represents that of the average African experience, and Botswana is a 
country with a low population that is blessed with, and dependent on one single natural 
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resource (diamond) that is quickly phasing out. One would think that South Africa, being 
the most modern economy on the continent, would serve as the model for African 
economies, but a March 2013 Economist article suggests:  
If there is one country that exemplifies the challenges awaiting Africa as it 
becomes richer and more developed, it is South Africa. It has the biggest 
economy and the most developed democracy among the larger African 
countries. However, it is also among the most unequal. In a global ranking 
by Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, South Africa comes 
off as one of the worst … the gap between rich and poor is now wider than 
under apartheid. There are many reasons for this, but the main one is the 
country’s failure to move up the economic development ladder. 
Industrialization has stalled. Sedated by mining income, politicians and 
voters see little need to make difficult adjustments. Above all, they are 
unwilling to free up labour markets. The rest of the continent must learn 
its lesson from this. Resource income is useful but it cannot replace other 
industries. Many countries know this but, like South Africa, they fail to 
create an environment in which businesses can prosper and create 
jobs.”155 
The economic realities in SSA are definitely changing but experts still struggle to 
make sense of it all. Unlike the Asian success stories that made their fortune on the 
manufacturing and exporting of finished consumer goods, Africa’s current and projected 
trends are not uniform. The service industry appears to be on course while the extractive 
sectors are already showing signs of distress as Chinese demand subsides. In fact, most 
analysts have consented that the commodity super-cycle—created mainly by increased 
demand from China—has already ended. Such countries as Kenya and Rwanda that are 
not blessed with many natural resources appear to have maintained recent gains. What the 
future holds for this latest trend is still anybody’s guess. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The thesis only reviews five obstacles to economic growth and the proposed 
recent shift in growth trends in SSA. As initially noted, the list of factors hindering the 
region’s economic growth is long and experts have yet to find a proven formula that will 
get the region on the right economic course. But if there are primary elements to which 
one can point to help explain the SSA’s stagnant phase, among them are the history of 
isolation, mismanagement, and the disadvantageous nature of economic relationships 
between Africans and all others.  
One can also conclude that given the nature of the world’s economic affairs in the 
last few decades, Africa and Africans were pulled into a system in which they had little 
preparation to compete. With its resources squandered, its leaders untrained or trained to 
mismanage, its people forced to produce excess for the benefits of others, Africa has 
certainly had its share of misuse and abuse. It was these abuses that precipitated the dual 
approach to economy. Despite the history, however, the traditional economy has no 
choice but to collaborate with the modern system because isolation is no longer an 
option. Both sectors need each other and long-term growth is near impossible if each 
sector evolve individually. 
What is known is that Africans are resilient. From relative isolation, slavery, 
colonization, imperialism, and exploitation, to the new world order of globalization, 
seasonal health crises, declining per-capita agricultural output, ineffective leadership, and 
threats of economic colonization, Africans remain resilient. This resilience has kept 
Africans from being written in the pages of history as a conquered civilization. This 
resiliency helped Africans to abrogate the yoke of political imperialism. It may well be 
this resilience that will help Africans to find their balance, the same way the Chinese, 
Indians, and countless other people and regions are finding their way out of economic 
slump after years of turbulence. 
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A. ISOLATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The culture and history problems with SSA’s slow economic growth derive from 
the region’s relative isolation. Markets in the region continue to be partially isolated 
within SSA, as well as from the outside world. Communication technology is said to be a 
potential help in closing the isolation gap. The previously discussed urbanization of 
African cities may also help. Regionalization of institutions and policies is also a step in 
the right direction but these efforts are still in the beginning stages after decades. Even at 
the beginning stages, such entities as the EU and such MNCs as Nestle and Coca-Cola, 
through their power of their funding assistance, have a bigger say in the future of these 
regional economic blocks than Africans.156 Internal integration is a long way in the 
making as Africans need to amass enough capacity to take charge of their economic 
destiny without having to rely on external assistance. 
Chapter II emphasized how the environment is now a barrier to economic growth. 
Economic analysts have provided enough details to validate that land degradation is 
indeed a reality in Africa although the explanations for the roots causes of such 
degradation varied. But it is this same environment that has provided so much that it 
made Africans generally less inclined to change. Europeans exercised similar norms prior 
to the population boom that forced people to be more aggressive in competition to create 
opportunities where none previously exist. It is only when discomfort is intense that 
humans spend time looking to ways to evolve. Some may see it as culture, but it boils 
down to motivation, or the lack thereof. Once Africans muster their courage to take 
charge of their environment, nature will do its part in helping to grow economies. 
It will be some time for Africans in the SSA to understand that despite their 
various borders and cultures, most of the world looks at Africans as one people. 
Consolidation of national economies is the first step to effective regionalization. The 
sooner Africans understand this process, the sooner they can begin working on 
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establishing the internal integration measures to solidify their position in this global 
economic reality.  
B. MISMANAGEMENT 
Policy and institutions were supposed to guide the economic growth and process 
in the region. Common sense quickly revealed the difficulties of using foreign 
management systems and tools that did not reflect the on-the-ground economic realities. 
The end result is that both management tools could not live up to their expectations. But, 
this problem is a matter of leadership, not of the tools per se because these tools have 
proven to work in other places. At the core of problem was the attempts to establish 
controls over an economic sector that only represent the minority interest of Africans. It 
could be that the history of subjugation limits African confidence in taking charge of their 
economic affairs, or the modern environment in which they were dragged is too advanced 
to comprehend. It cannot be that the persuasive power of non-African actors is such that 
Africans are condemned to be, as Onyeni would say, “economic slaves.”  
C. EXOGENOUS ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
The general prescription for economic development in Africa, as far as the outside 
world is concerned, is for Africans to open their markets to trade, investments, less 
control and barriers. Simply put, the expectation is to create a free-for-all scenario in 
which foreign and national entrepreneurs can find their niche and compete. This ideal 
sounds good. After all, it is the way of capitalist markets to attract investments, create 
competition, and expand.  
But the question of “what’s in it for Africa” continues to linger. Pre-independence 
Africa was a free-for-all, but Africans were not part of that equation. Consequently, post-
independence left Africans with little to no capability to be shareholders in the laissez-
faire scenario that the world is proposing. The few among Africans who benefit from the 
current arrangement seem not to care, nor do they reinvest their gains in Africa. Like the 
African political elite, foreign concessions are only in the game to maximize profit, while 
little of the gains are re-invested in the continent. There are few signs that foreign 
investment will focus on manufacturing. Such job-creating investments are reserved for 
 70 
foreigners’ homelands – China included. What’s in the laissez-faire market scenario for 
Africans? If recent trends can provide some hints to an answer, the answer will be: not 
much. 
The SSA economies will have no choice but to grow, regardless of all the 
aforementioned challenges. As Severino noted, an Africa with the current population 
growth rate will quickly impose itself on the world and demand to be recognized.157 The 
question is how and who will control this growth? Any durable economic development 
will require that it be one made in Africa, by Africans and for Africans. Anything less 
will result in the continued scenario in which weak government solicits assistance to 
survive, foreign interests focus on cheap gains, and the vast indigenous markets continue 
with business as usual.  
D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE WORK 
Future works can focus on methods and approaches that governments, the private 
sector, and the international community can take to narrow the gap between the formal 
and the informal economy. In the last two years, several countries in the region have 
rebased their GDP to include elements of the informal sectors that were not previously 
calculated in annual statistics. As previously mentioned, rebasing measures nearly 
doubled Nigeria’s GDP in 2014 to become Africa’s largest economy.158 As Sy 
concludes, “Tanzania’s [GDP] grew by a third, Kenya’s and Zambia’s increased by a 
quarter and Uganda’s rose by 13 percent” after adding elements of the informal sector in 
GDP calculations.159 But what does it all mean? Does it mean that the elements that are 
now calculated have become part of the formal economy that can be leveraged to spur 
development? Future work can help answer these questions because given the history of 
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the dual economy, it is highly unlikely that counting elements of the informal sector into 
national GDP is enough to formalize these sectors. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ACTORS 
It appears that the different factions in the local economies, governments, and the 
international community are focusing on different ways, means, and desired ends when 
searching for the best way ahead with SSA economies. Since governments and their 
international backers are the ones making big plans, the mass populations in the informal 
sector appear to be asking: What’s in it for me, or, why should I join the grand plans that 
surface every so often? Neither governments nor the international community have 
heeded to this very simple question. Under such a context, the best one can do is to 
provide some recommendations for the internal factions, as well as the international 
community that mostly knows and understands the formal methods of economy because 
it is the system practiced at home.  
1. Internal Recommendations 
Internally, it is not enough for governments to pass laws and regulations to make 
the shadow economy formal. The informal sector will resist and evade such an approach 
just like they have done in the past. Policies and credible institutions will be required, but 
the approach to the formalization of the traditional economy must be gradual. More 
importantly, if governments are going to demand formality, they must also be prepared to 
provide alternative survival means during and after the transition. Given the historic lack 
of capability of the average African government, such opportunities may have to be 
created through leadership within the private sector of the traditional economy if 
formality ever becomes the general goal. However, for the private sector to take charge of 
transforming the informal sector, governments will have to maintain the historic stance of 
not getting overly involved, except for the provision of minimal law enforcement and 
security. The private sector will also require much help and assistance from the 
international community of financial institutions, governments, donors, and advisors. 
Such a scenario may create opportunities for foreign and more knowledgeable 
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entrepreneurs to work directly with the African private sector, bypassing the governments 
that have often been more of an obstacle than an asset.  
2. International Recommendation 
Historically, large international companies that do business in Africa only focus 
on niche markets that provide quick returns for shareholders. The same goes for the mid-
size firms that operate in the import/export or retail businesses. Whether it is the Chinese, 
Indians, Lebanese, and the few Africans involved in retail, the approach has been to 
purchase cheap manufactured products abroad for sale on the African markets while most 
of the return is reinvested elsewhere. This tendency toward what African proverbs call 
“milking the cow, while refusing to feed the cow” will have to change. But such a shift 
will have to start with fixing the corrupt governing systems that are making it possible for 
foreign businesses to only milk the cow.  
Elements of the international community that claim to be helping African 
economies can make the difference. However, after more than half a century of claiming 
to be helping Africa, there appears to be something fundamentally wrong with either the 
approach or the choice of partners. First of all, it appears as if the international helpers 
have totally written off the economic sector that supports the majority of Africa. It should 
have been clear by now that the insistence on trying to get African business practices to 
mirror those of the outside world is not going to work. Africans have had unique 
historical experiences that make them respond to market incentives differently. Maybe 
it’s time to stop telling Africans how to be and give them a stake in shaping the future of 
how things are going to be. Too much focus is put on working with political elites who 
know little to nothing about economy. Helping to shape local and regional entities that 
can amass local synergy to stand on-par with international economic institutions and 
enterprises is a good start.  
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